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Energy in Europe 
Introduction by Commissioner Cardoso e Cunha 
on the occasion of the World Energy Conference 
Montreal, September 1989· 
It is appropriate at this major conference that we address as one of our key themes «Sustainable 
Energy Growth - Attainable or Impossible?». Essentially the question is «can we continue to 
develop the world's energy supplies, on a secure and economic basis, sufficient to maintain 
economic growth whilst at the same time ensuring that the global environment is protected and 
indeed improved?» Such a fundamental question can only be put in a global context. 
This document is a contribution by the Commission of the European Communities to this 
theme. Following a brief review of current developments in energy policy at Community level, 
including the drive to complete the Community Internal Energy Market by the end of1992, there 
is a first preview of the long-term study currently underway in the Commission entitled «Major 
Themes in Energy to 2010». This shows possible alternative paths for our energy future. One is 
a «conventional route» with continuing growth in energy consumption and CO2 emissions. 
Another path suggests a way of controlling energy consumption and its environmental impact 
whilst at the same time maintaining economic growth - the challenge of sustainable energy 
growth. 
The European Community and Energy 
From all points of view, the European Community is a major player on the world scene. Its 
population of 325 million persons produces nearly 5 billion ecu of goods and services a year which 
amounts to 20% of world production. The Community is a major trader accounting for around 37% 
of world trade. 
The same is true in the energy sector. Last year, the Community accounted for some 14% of the 
world's energy consumption and 8% of world energy production. As in other sectors, the 
Community is heavily involved in energy trade, accounting for 38% of world energy trade. No less 
than 45% of the Community's total energy supplies are imported from third countries. The health 
and vitality of the European Community rests upon safe and secure supplies of energy which are 
economic and environmentally sound. 
Whilst talking about the European Community as a whole, it is important to bear in mind the 
diversity which exists between Member States, in the energy sector as much as in others. For 
example, energy resources are not evenly divided within the Community. At the one extreme, there 
is the UK with its rich natural endowment of coal, oil and gas reserves, whilst others like Belgium, 
Portugal and Luxembourg lack substantial energy resources. Likewise energy consumption and 
trade patterns differ considerably between Member States and even regions of the Community. 
The 1992 Single European Market 
Despite these differences, energy policy is increasingly being undertaken at Community level. 
Nowhere is this more true than in the Community's drive to complete the Internal Energy Market 
by the end of 1992. For the European Community, 1992 is the symbol of renewed dynamism and 
this is as true in the energy sector as anywhere else. 
The blueprint for achieving the Single Energy Market was set out by the Commission in May 19881. 
The Commission's action plan was given political endorsement by Energy Ministers later in the 
year. We are now at the critical stage of making proposals to the Council of Energy Ministers on a 
range of highly significant issues which, if adopted, will begin to change the face of energy in the 
Community. 
1 «The Internal Energy Market» (COM(88)238 final) published as a special edition of «Energy in Europe» 
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In October this year, Energy Ministers will be asked to agree proposals which will increase 
exchanges of electricity and gas within the Community by organising the implementation of the 
right of transit for utilities within and across national borders. At a later stage and before 1992, 
following consultations with the parties concerned, the Commission will put forward further 
proposals on third party access for large consumers and distributors to the gas and electricity 
networks. 
Also on Energy Ministers' agenda this autumn will be proposals to extend a system of price 
transparency to large industrial consumers in the gas and electricity sectors. Price and indeed cost 
transparency are seen as vital ingredients to a truly integrated, single energy market based on fair 
and open competition. 
In the same vein, the Commission has also made proposals to ensure co-ordination between 
Member States and the Commission when planning investments for the production and transport of 
energy in the Community. Energy policy makers and decision takers must henceforth be 
encouraged to plan from a Community point of view rather than from a strictly national standpoint. 
These specific proposals will be followed by others, all designed to introduce greater competition in 
the Community's energy sector and to remove restrictive national barriers. By increasing 
competition and exploiting the advantages of a large, single market, energy prices will be reduced to 
the benefit of all energy consumers. This in turn will increase the competitiveness of Community 
industry on world markets. The stakes are high. Potential benefits of achieving the Internal Energy 
Market have been put as high as 30 billion ecus per year. 
Further Elements in Community Energy Policy 
The drive to complete the Internal Energy Market is the Community's highest energy policy priority 
at present but it is not being pursued in isolation. Energy security of supply remains of paramount 
concern despite today's reasonably relaxed energy markets. No one should forget the suffering 
caused by the oil crises of the 1970's, both at an individual level and to our economies. The 
Community will strive to maintain and improve diversity in energy supplies, avoiding undue 
dependence on any single supply source, and to achieve the energy efficiency gains which are so 
sorely needed. Within the Community framework, all energy options will be kept open, including 
the safe use of nuclear power and the clean use of coal. In addition, the Community will continue to 
develop ways and means to be able to respond effectively in an international context to any future 
supply crisis. 
Energy policy can no longer be developed without deep consideration of the implications for the 
environment. This applies at all stages of the energy chain from the time energy is produced, 
through transportation and use, to waste disposal. Such environmental threats as acid rain, the 
depletion of the ozone layer, the safe removal of toxic waste and above all, global climate warming 
will from now on help determine the shape of future Community energy policy. In line with the 
Single European Act of 1987, all Commission proposals must henceforth take as their base a high 
level of environmental protection and safety. The Commission is busy considering alternative 
energy strategies to take fully into account the need to preserve and indeed improve our 
environmental heritage. 
The contribution that energy technology must make to energy security and a clean environment 
cannot be underestimated. It is fitting therefore that the Commission this year has launched a new 
5-year energy technology programme called «THERMIE». Once agreed by the Member States, the 
programme should commence in 1990 and will cover the areas of energy efficiency, renewable 
energies, hydrocarbon development and the clean use of coal. Special emphasis will be given among 
other things to environmental benefits, the dissemination of energy technology within the 
Community, small and medium enterprises, and joint projects involving undertakings from more 
than one Member State. 
The diversity within the Community has already been mentioned. This extends to differences in 
economic well-being between Member States and regions. The Community has a policy to narrow 
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such differences under a heading of economie and social cohesion. To achieve this the Community 
has at its disposal some 52 billion ecus to be allocated by 1993 in the form of the Structural Funds. 
To provide perspective, this is in real terms more than the amount available under the Marshall Aid 
programme which put Europe back on its feet after World War II. 
Substantial amounts of these Funds and from other sources will be spent on energy projects, for 
example energy infrastructure, to redress the balance between the well-off and poorer parts of the 
Community. 
Community energy policy has to be put in a global context. There must be an external dimension. In 
addition to energy trade, the Community aims to develop structured relationships with energy 
producer and consumer countries whether they be developed or developing. This is carried out 
bilaterally and on a multilateral basis. External energy relations form a significant element of 
Community energy policy. The aim is to develop trading links and build increased understanding 
and awareness in a world that is rapidly shrinking and where international co-operation is 
increasingly necessary. 
Energy policy arrived at is not in isolation. The Commission, as the initiator of Community energy 
policy, consults as widely as possible when formulating proposals. Depending on the proposals 
concerned, consultations can embrace Member States, industry, local Government, research and 
academic institutions and third countries. Only after extensive consultation can the Commission 
produce balanced and rational policy proposals. This is especially true in the case of the Internal 
Energy Market when interests can very often be opposed to one another. 
The logic of the 1992 process is leading the Community towards a truly common energy policy, 
requiring a framework for the internal Community dynamic as well as for relations with the rest of 
the world. This will be central to the Commission's thinking as the Community's medium-term 
energy strategy is revised and extended over the coming 12-18 months. The Commission's «Major 
Themes in Energy to 2010» will make an important contribution to this work. 
In January 1989, the present Commission of the European Communities took up its responsibilities 
under the Presidency of Mr Jacques Delors. The Commissioner with responsibility for energy in the 
Commission is Mr Antonio CARDOSO E CUNHA. 
Mr Cardoso e Cunha is a graduate from an institute for chemical and industrial engineering (Institute 
technique supérieur de génie chimique et industriel). From 1965 to 1976 he was the President and 
Director-General of a large group of private companies operating in Angola. He then became Director of 
several private sector companies in Portugal before becoming Secretary of State for External Trade in 
1978 and Secretary of State for the Manufacturing Industry in 1979. In January 1980 he was appointed 
Minuter for Agriculture and Fisheries. 
Following the adhesion of Portugal to the European Community in January 1986, Mr Cardoso e Cunha 
was appointed as Commissioner with special responsibilities for Fisheries. 
In addition to energy, his present responsibilities also include personnel, administration and translation, 
the Euratom Supply Agency, small businesses, distributive trades and tourism and cooperatives. 
Mr Cardoso e Cunha is 55 years old, married with four children. 
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This discussion paper is presented by the Commission of 
the European Communities as a contribution to ongoing 
debate about energy's future development. The results 
and analyses in this paper are preliminary. Comments, 
suggestions and criticisms are most welcome. These can 
be addressed to: 
Mr K Leydon 
Head of Division: Analyses and Forecasting 
Directorate-General for Energy 
Commission of the European Communities 
200 rue de la Loi 
Β-1049 Brussels 
Belgium 
Telex : COMEU Β 21877 
Fax : Brussels 235.01.50 
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Foreword 
The Commission of the European Communities' Directorate-General for Energy has been examining 
many of the factors that could influence the Community's energy future and trying to see what this future 
might look like. Of the range of influences at work on both the demand for and supply of energy, a 
number are identified as «major themes» which may determine the direction of future policy in the early 
1990 's. 
Arriving at a working consensus about the broad direction of policy is important in tackling the 
challenges posed to the energy sector. The present analysis is presented to facilitate a dialogue between 
often opposing interests; leading eventually to a better understanding between world partners and, within 
the Community, to the development of an energy policy commensurate with the challenges of the internal 
market, developments in world energy, and with cherishing the environment. 
This discussion paper is presented as a contribution to the ongoing debate on energy questions. Our 
results are preliminary. Comments, suggestions and criticisms are most welcome. 
Challenges and themes 
The past twenty years have been turbulent ones for 
the energy sector, with major consequences for the 
economic and social Ufe of the world's citizens. 
Certainly there is no surprise-free future; some of 
these surprises may be benign - such as a major 
breakthrough in energy efficiency. Equally, there is 
the uncertainty of major disruptions to energy 
supply - the risk of war, major accidents or serious 
environmental deterioration. 
There is indeed always uncertainty - risk cannot be 
avoided, but can it be better "managed"? Clearly 
energy is firmly embedded in a rapidly evolving 
economic and political setting. Its development will 
be influenced by outside events but, because of its 
basic strategic importance, it can itself effect 
economic and environmental conditions. Perhaps 
because of the complexity of the relationships, with 
all the uncertainties, we have more need today for a 
robust policy framework. 
Certainly there is no lack of interesting challenges 
and questions to address. These include: 
- How can growing demand for energy services be 
reconciled with the need to improve the quality of 
the environment? 
- Can we realise the Community's internal market in 
the energy sector without putting at risk our security 
of supply? 
- Are the objectives of strong economic growth, a 
clean environment and moderately priced, secure 
energy supply compatible? 
Addressing these and similar questions requires 
reflecting on energy and its interaction with: 
- economic growth and the impact of the internal 
market; 
- the environment and particularly CO2 and SO2 and 
NOx emissions; 
We also need to study: 
- the role for technology in mastering energy 
consumption; in producing more efficiently our 
supply and cutting down on emissions; 
- the need for continuing attention to energy security 
and what this means in the 1990s; and 
- the Community's needs in a global context, how 
other regions will develop; our partners in OECD, 
neighbours in the rest of Europe and in the Medi-
terranean Basin, and in the developing countries. 
Scope of the analysis 
Drawing on internal analyses, specially commissioned 
studies and exchanges of views with experts in 
Member States and in the energy sector, the major 
themes of energy and economic growth, environment, 
technology and security were reviewed in a global 
setting. The three scenarios presented as a 
framework for reflection seek: 
a) to present the "conventional wisdom" currently 
reigning in the energy world about the long-term 
outlook (Scenario 1); 
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b) to test the robustness of these views (Scenario 2) 
and, finally, 
c) to define the framework required to achieve strong 
economic growth, a cleaner environment, with 
secure supply of moderately priced energy 
(Scenario 3). 
The scenarios chosen are not "forecasts" of what will 
happen; rather they seek to explore the issues 
involved and to offer a basis for wide-ranging 
discussion on what could constitute the "Energy 
Agenda" for the 1990s. 
The Community summary presented here is based on 
detailed Member State supply and demand analysis, 
sector by sector and fuel by fuel with special studies 
prepared on world economic outlook, energy re-
sources, world coal and oil prices, the role of 
technology in both the production and use of energy, 
the future of the car, and a new innovation - emission 
balances for C02, NOx and S02. 
The Directorate-General for Energy acknowledges 
the active cooperation of the Systems Analysis Unit 
of the Directorate-General for Research and Devel-
opment, particularly in the development of emission 
balances, the development of the MIDAS model and 
cofinancing part of the supply and demand analysis. 
C h a p t e r 1 - The challenge 
Addressing the 1989 World Energy Conference in 
Montreal, Commissioner Cardoso e Cunha put the 
challenge for the European Community when he 
said: 
"Energy is politics in the noblest sense of that 
word It effects us all in our daily lives, lighting 
and heating our homes, powering our factories 
and providing us with the freedom of transport. 
But in doing so we consume the world's resources 
and create pollution. The challenge is to provide 
energy services efficiently, cleanly and at 
moderate cost; this we must address not only 
within the European Community but with our 
global partners. " 
Over the past twenty years the failure to manage 
energy has cost the Community part of its growth 
potential - perhaps half of its potential between 1974 
and 1981, leading to large scale unemployment, 
severe strains on the balance of payments and on 
world financial management. The debt problem in 
developing countries, a serious continuing problem, 
has much of its origins in the attempt to cushion 
those economies from the full rigour of the resulting 
recessions. 
Yet there were positive effects as well. These include 
fundamental changes in the pattern of energy 
consumption resulting from major restructuring of 
the industrial sectors and the way both the transport 
and domestic users sought to reduce the full effect on 
their economic welfare. 
Energy production also changed - greater stimulation 
of non-OPEC oil production, the penetration of gas, 
the growth in the contribution of nuclear energy and 
coal to power generation. 
The effect of changes on both the volume and 
efficiency of energy use and the production mix are 
still being felt. The energy sector is still in transition 
but there are few supply sources which are accepted 
today without controversy - nuclear because of 
radiation fears, oil because of price shocks, coal, gas 
and oil because of CO2 and other emissions. Growing 
reliance on imports for all fuels deepens these 
concerns. 
Concern on the supply side is mirrored in the 
uncertainty surrounding the growth in consumption 
particularly for electricity and transportation fuels. 
This is reinforced by indications of a slowdown in the 
improvement in efficiency and conservation. 
Currently energy policy is unclear. Indeed, there is 
little consensus as to the basis for future policy. 
Consequently, the need arises for a full debate of the 
factors which could determine the structure of the 
sector - a debate facilitated by the availability of a 
clear and objective analysis which looks at how 
energy will interact with economic development, and 
the internal market with the environment; how 
technology will assist in being more efficient in 
energy production and use; and what risks there 
could be to energy security. 
Energy and growth 
There is a close link between economic growth and 
the availability and price of energy. In the late 19th 
century and early twentieth century coal was the basic 
energy source in Europe. Regions with coal were the 
first to industralize and this, linked particularly to the 
iron and steel industry, formed the industrial heart-
lands of many of the Community's Member States. 
Those without indigenous resources imported them. 
Gradually, after the second world war oil replaced 
coal, drawing resources from the newly available 
fields in the Middle East, and Europe became a 
major market, after the United States, for oil. 
While European reconstruction was fuelled by coal, 
the economic boom of the 1960's looked more and 
more to oil as the essential fuel - meeting the 
expanding transport market, a demand which 
underlays the substantial car industry which 
developed simultaneously. 
One of the key traditional indicators of economic 
welfare is the demand for electricity. Over the past 
eighty years this demand has grown steadily and elec-
tricity will be the fuel for the electronic age. 
The structure of economic activity, its volume and 
rate of growth has been strongly correlated to the 
type of energy source available. Coming to the close 
of the century the fuel mix choice is much wider than 
it was in the early decades when coal was the 
essential source of commercial energy. Today coal, 
gas, oil and electricity compete in many markets, for 
example, domestic heating and cooking, industrial 
processes (under boiler markets), and gas, coal and 
nuclear are available for power generation. Only the 
transport sector and specific electricity uses are 
natural preserves of one particular fuel. But they are 
the leading sectors for energy consumption! 
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Oil price developments of 1973 and 1979/80 raised 
serious questions about traditional views on the link 
between growth and energy. The fear of being cut off 
from oil sources and the sharp increases in prices to 
historically high levels shocked the world economy, 
threatening the financial system, bringing growth to a 
halt and questioning confidence in the total economic 
system. 
The structure of the industrial process began to alter, 
as did the energy/growth relationship until one 
heard, around 1983/4, that the link between energy 
and growth was broken. Certainly the relationship has 
changed, but it has not been broken. This is true for 
industrialized as well as centrally planned and de-
veloping countries. Incremental changes in economic 
welfare require additional energy - the amount 
required per unit has been reduced and will continue 
to fall, but nevertheless, additional energy is required 
- more in developing countries and in centrally 
planned economies than in OECD countries. 
During the late '70's and early '80's policy initiatives 
began to be effective in restructuring the energy 
sector and particularly in how oil is used. 
But that is history. Looking to the future the 
Community's growth is closely linked with achieving 
the single market; a major policy area which requires 
a strong energy contribution, affecting the demand 
for energy through higher economic growth, changes 
in industrial and commercial structures and through 
evolving individual consumption patterns (influenced 
by tax harmonisation). 
The completion of the internal market will also 
influence the supply side. Cost structures will be 
affected through public tendering, increased trade 
and market integration, reduction of State aids, 
pricing and tariff transparency, leading to changing 
market behaviour by the key actors. 
The full dynamic of the internal energy market is 
difficult to quantify, indeed much of the detail has yet 
to be defined, yet it will have a central role when 
defining future energy policy. 
Energy and environment 
Reflecting the growing concern with the environment 
and particularly CO2, SO2 and NOx emissions and 
the fact that, without attention, these pollutants 
would increase, the Commission, following the 
emphasis put on environment in the Single European 
Act, has initiated a range of actions which have direct 
effect on the energy sector - car emissions, SO2 
abatement etc. Work in this policy area is likely to 
intensify as detailed legislation is adopted in the 
coming years and will have direct effects on how we 
use energy and the price we pay for it. Two areas 
which will be particularly affected are power 
generation and transport, sectors in which demand is 
growing above the average. These sectors are key to 
the normal economic and social life, but pose major 
challenges in reducing emission levels while popular 
demand for these energy services continues to grow. 
To facilitate the debate surrounding energy and 
environment this report presents an important 
innovation by providing matching emission balances 
accompanying the traditional energy balances1·2·3. 
The global dimension of the climate question and the 
transfrontier dimension of other pollutants implies a 
wider analysis beyond the Community. 
Energy and technology 
Greater energy efficiency and fuel conservation 
facilitated by improvements in technology and its 
application to both using and producing energy is 
perhaps the key to reconciling many of the conflicting 
forces at work - the desire for the benefits energy 
offers and the wish to avoid the negative 
consequences of increasing pollution. 
We look to technology as a means of improving 
considerably the efficient use of electricity and trans-
portation fuels - thus reducing the production levels 
required to meet the service levels desired. We look 
also at how technology can contribute to more 
efficient production techniques, reducing pollution 
and helping to maintain production cost levels. 
During discussions with experts two distinct views 
emerged. While there was general agreement on the 
vital importance of improving energy efficiency, 
opinions differed on whether the full potential for 
efficiency would be achieved. Some argued that given 
reigning oil prices, little was expected because of the 
lack of price incentive. Others considered that the 
potential for improving energy efficiency was very 
important and that not only was it "on the shelf" but it 
would be exploited and that considerable reduction in 
consumption could be expected through time. 
1 Demand Side Analysis to 2010 (Working Paper): Prepared 
by A Dumort (Bureau d'Etude Technique Economique et 
Prospectif) in working cooperation with the Analysis and 
Forecasting Division of DG XvU 
2 Supply Side Analysis and Energy Balances: J-F Guilmot 
(Energy Systems Analysis and Ränning) in working 
cooperation with the Analysis and Forecasting Division of 
DGXVII. 
3 Emission Balance Sheets to 2010 for CO2. NOx and SO2: 
prepared by CO< H> ERENCE S.C. 
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Opinions on the future change radically depending on 
the view held about improving efficiencies. Because 
of this, two special reports on future penetration of 
better technology were commissioned4·5. 
Energy security 
Energy security is, and will remain, a pillar of 
Community energy policy. Import dependency is a 
feature of the Community's energy supply. 
We reached, in the mid-1980's, the lowest level of 
dependency since the early 1970's. However, this 
dependency is likely to grow in the future. 
Concern with supply of and the price for oil 
dominated thinking in the 1970's and early 1980's. We 
have already discussed how the price shocks of 1973 
and 1979/80 had major consequences for economic 
growth - pushing the world economies into deep 
recessions and putting in train fundamental changes 
in economic structures. 
The resulting changes in the structure and level of 
energy use - substituting gas, coal and nuclear for oil 
in the various end use markets (except for transport) 
and power generation and the reduction in the 
volume of energy required for each unit of GDP have 
been important and probably long-lasting. But 
consumption is increasing and essentially the 
Community will import the incremental barrel of oil, 
cubic metre of gas and tonne of coal. 
In addition the quality of these imports of oil and coal 
will be important - the trend towards low sulphur 
content in gasoil and fuel oil could increase the 
premium accorded to low sulpher materials in inter-
national trade. Thus, looking to the future and 
assessing the dangers, and indeed the opportunities, 
requires reflection on the resource base6, sources of 
supply, the world supply and demand balance and 
resulting oil price paths which could develop in the 
1990's. 
to USD 30 a barrel (and here the debate is active 
between those who support a USD 15 to USD 20 
range and supporters of a USD 25 to USD 30 
possibility). There is currently no school advocating 
sustained USD 40 to USD 60 oil. There is a declared 
willingness to supply by all major sources. Similarly 
views on coal prices and supply are equally benign. 
How robust is- todays conventional thinking? 
(Annex I). 
The Community 
in a global setting 
The global dimension is the appropriate setting for 
reviewing resources, pressure on these resources 
from other OECD users, centrally planned 
economies and developing countries. External energy 
relations provide opportunities for better definition of 
Community interest in the Gulf area, Eastern Europe 
and the Mediterranean Basin which can complement 
our traditional links with other OECD partners. To 
place the Community's energy future in context, views 
on demand/import requirements of other regions 
were developed (Annex II). 
These traditional interests in global energy trends 
were reinforced by growing concern with the 
environment and in particular with world climate. 
While the scientific community has yet to offer final 
guidance on what is popularly called the "greenhouse 
effect" and the possible future climatic changes, the 
current concern with CO2 can only be adequately 
tackled on a global basis. 
The Community must be able to follow 
energy/environment trends - placing its emissions in 
context, assessing impacts of possible strategies (e.g. 
the Toronto conference recommendation on CO2 
reduction by 2005), and finally developing joint action 
pro-grammes. To facilitate such work, CO2 emission 
balances are estimated on a global basis in addition 
to a view on the energy supply and demand trends. 
Perception about the security dimension does change. 
In the 1970's the current wisdom was of imminent 
depletion of energy resources, with steadily rising 
prices to levels predicted for the late 80's, three and 
four times actual prevailing prices. 
Today's common wisdom is of sufficient resources. 
Expected prices for 2000 for oil range from USD 15 
Les Equipements de Maîtrise de l'Energie en Europe: 
Explicit S.A. 
Developments in Supply Side Technology: Bureau 
d'Informations et de Prévisions Economiques. 
Energy Resource: M. Grenon 
Scenario approach 
To explore further possible energy futures for the 
Community three scenarios have been developed. 
The first reflects "conventional wisdom", a view based 
on "business as usual", certainly not without dynamic 
elements but which does not foresee fundamental 
changes in the way people think about energy. 
The second scenario, "driving into tensions", tests the 
robustness of the first by searching for the limitations 
to its coherence - and finds it wanting. If economic 
growth were to be faster and if the relative decline of 
traditional heavy industry was slower and later than 
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expected, pressure on prices and emission levels 
could be such as to place in doubt the rate of 
economic growth (about 3.5% as against 2.7% for the 
Community in the first scenario). 
The third scenario, "sustaining high economic 
growth", is deliberately normative. It seeks to explore 
and define the conditions in which higher economic 
growth, a clean environment and secure and 
moderately priced energy would be compatible 
objectives. Each is a desirable objective - but are they 
mutually attainable and what must be done to 
balance what some regard as opposing objectives? 
Each of the major themes described in this chapter 
are analysed within each of the three scenarios. 
Annex IN contains the summary energy balance 
sheets for the three scenarios and Annex IV the 
corresponding emission balances for CO2. Balances 
for NOx and SO2 for Scenario 1 are also included. 
C h a p t e r 2 -A conventional view of the future - Scenario 1 
A steadily changing wor ld 
A Community population increasing only slowly 
but with more money to spend more time to 
spend it and growing increasingly concerned 
about the environment in which it lives. 
How much energy will be required will be 
determined by the size, make-up and lifestyle of the 
population and, of course, the rate of economic 
growth. In the final accounting, it will also depend on 
how efficiently we recover it and/or convert it from 
one form to another and how efficiently we use it. 
Technology will continue to improve and the effects 
on end-use and on production could be important -
resulting in substantial efficiencies (35% decrease in 
energy intensity). The distinguishing feature is the 
lack of special concern with energy policy, with 
market forces driving the system within existing policy 
frameworks. The setting for the scenario defining 
conventional wisdom is described in Box A. 
Economic Growth 
Scenario 1 is based on a steady, if unspectacular, 
economic growth (2.7% p.a. over the period) with the 
gradual development of existing policies and ways of 
thinking about issues. 
The corresponding world GDP is 3.2%, with develop-
ing countries growing at 4%, the centrally planned 
economies at 2.7% and OECD with an average 
growth of 2.8%. 
Population 
Over the next twenty years we do not see any major 
change in the size of the population of the European 
Community, with perhaps another 5 million people 
before the end of the century and then virtually no 
increase over the next ten years. However, because of 
a falling birthrate - and increasing life expectancy -
the average age of the population will steadily 
increase. In the Community, by the end of the period, 
nearly half of the population will be 45 years old or 
older. The average person will have more money to 
spend and, probably, more time in which to spend it. 
The number of households will increase appreciably 
and more people will own cars. Both the houses and 
the cars could well be bigger, on average, than today. 
Figure 1 
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Scenario 1 assumptions 
This scenario is based on steady if unspectacular economic growth, with the gradual development of 
existing policies and ways of thinking about issues. Technology will continue to improve and the effects on 
end use and on production could be important resulting in improved efficiencies. The distinguishing 
feature is the lack of special concern with energy policy, with market forces driving the system within 
existing frameworks. 
Scenario 1 definition: "Conventional wisdom" 
1. International setting 
■ Energy prices (1987 US dollars): 
OU USD 17.5/bbl in 1995; USD 20/bbl in 2000 and USD 30/bbl in 2010; 
Gas indexed to oil up to 2000 and to coal thereafter; 
Coal USD 49/tce in 1995; USD 50/tce in 2000 and USD 60/tce in 2010. 
■ Economic outlook, GDP: 
World at 3.2% average annual growth from 1990 to 2010; 
CPEs at 2.7% average annual growth from 1990 to 2010; 
LDCs at 4.0% average annual growth from 1990 to 2010; 
OECD at 2.8% average annual growth from 1990 to 2010. 
2. European Community 
■ Internal market: Moderate, but positive macroeconomic effect. The economic outlook up to 1993 is 
similar to that indicated in the report "Europe in 1993" prepared by BIPE et al (2.6 % annual GDP 
growth rate). 
■ GDP: 2.7% average annual growth from 1990 to 2010 (that for 1968-88 averaged 2.8 %). 
■ Sectors: 
Industry some industrial growth; stability of energy-intensive branches; 
Tertiary strong growth of services; 
Domestic 2.5% growth in private consumption from 1990 to 2010. 
3. Energy-related aspects 
■ Resources: Assumes that over the next 20 years there are no physical resource limitations. 
■ Technology: Further penetration of new (although existing) industrial processes (e.g. electric 
furnace, continuous casting); penetration of more efficient industrial equipment (10% improvement); 
efficiency of domestic thermal uses improving by 10%; renewal of equipment at end of normal life 
time; penetration of electric appliances at a faster rate thus improving efficiency. 
■ Behaviour: Industrial energy demand following economic climate; wealthier people facing relatively 
low prices leading to reversible behaviour (e.g. car mileage; higher space heating) up to 1995 and 
more rational behaviour thereafter. 
4. Policy aspects 
■ Energy internal market: Following most of current views in Member States and uncertainties about 
final decisions of the Council, there is no explicit assumption of a complete internal market in 
energy, such as in the fields of tax harmonisation and electricity and gas trade; some convergence of 
both pre-tax fuel and investment costs between Member States is anticipated. 
■ Environment: Application of Community legislation; this is not expected to significantly constrain 
the energy demand and supply system (balance and fuel mix). 
■ Energy: No special concern on energy, allowing market forces to drive the whole system within the 
existing policy framework. 
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As a result we could require more energy per person 
- final demand today is about 2.2 tonnes of oil 
equivalent per person which could rise to 2.6 toe in 
2010 - even if more energy-efficient appliances were 
to be available. 
Oil Price 
It is "generally accepted" that the price of oil will, over 
time, follow an upward trend - partly to pay for the 
fuel and partly to encourage further exploration. Of 
course, variations in the oil price over the last 40 
years, for example, do not clearly support this. We 
opted in this scenario for a smoothly increasing oil 
price - leading to a 20$/barrel in 2000 and a 
30$/barrel in 2010 (in 1987 prices). Many other 
scenarios are, of course, possible (see Annex I). 
Exchange rate fluctuations could, of course, have a 
bigger effect on what we will pay for our oil than the 
price of oil itself. 
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Regional variations 
A Community of twelve Member States, each with its 
own culture and traditions, growing at different speeds, 
with different uses and requirements for energy, and 
different ways of producing it. 
While we often talk of the European Community as a 
single unit, it is important to remember that it is 
made up of twelve Member States which have widely 
different characteristics and which have been 
developing at different rates - and in different 
directions - over hundreds of years. Membership of 
the Community, which for some countries is as short 
as three years, has not - fortunately - resulted in a 
monotonous homogeneity. In some ways, in fact, the 
Community is less homogeneous now than in the 
1960s. At that time the energy structures were all oil-
based. This is no longer the case. 
We expect quite large variations in economic growth 
both between the earlier and later part of the period 
and from one country to another. In general the less 
developed countries of the Community would have 
the fastest growth, but because the existing 
differences in the standards of living are quite 
substantial they will require particular attention 
under the cohesion policies of the single market. 
Infrastructure investment will be an important 
requirement. 
The energy outlook 
Growing final energy demand - Steady growth in all 
sectors with transport continuing to be the determining 
factor in how much oil we use. Electricity increasing its 
share of the market and gas substituting for oil and 
solid fuels - but at a slower rate. Outside of power 
generation, solid fuel use declining. 
Steady growth is expected in final energy demand in 
all sectors; growing on average by under 1% per 
annum (0.8%). But this long-run growth rate is the 
result of two distinct trends: the rate of growth being 
much faster to the mid-1990s (at IY2% per annum) 
declining in the later period to '/:% p.a.. This decline 
is due to changes in economic structures, technical 
efficiencies and saturation in some markets (e.g. car 
ownership, household appliances). Transport will 
continue to be the determining factor in how much 
oil we use. By individual fuel, electricity will increase 
its share of the market, as substitution for oil and 
solid fuels continues - but at a slower rate than in the 
past. Outside of power generation, solid fuel use will 
decline. 
The consumption of energy in its final form in the 
Community is expected to rise from its present 
annual level of close to 700 mtoe to around 810 mtoe 
by the turn of the century, and close to 850 mtoe by 
2010. With GDP growing faster than final energy 
consumption during this period (2.7%/year), the 
ratio between the two, the "energy intensity", will 
gradually decline from 0.2 to 0.13 tonnes of oil per 
1000 ECU (1980), a decrease of 35%. 
By sector, transport and industry grow at about 1% 
over the twenty year period but transport grows much 
faster to 1995 - about 2.2% p.a. with industry and the 
domestic sector growing at 1.3% p.a.. As one goes 
towards the end of the century the rate of increase for 
all sectors drops significantly. 
Looking at consumption by fuel type indicates some 
important changes. Solid fuels will lose ground in 
both of its major sectors - industry and 
residential/tertiary. Oil use will increase in all sectors 
except the residential/tertiary sector where it will 
show a steady decline. Both gas and electricity could 
grow strongly in both these sectors with electricity 
growing the faster of the two. 
Table 1 : Incremental final energy 
Solids 
Oil 
Gas 
Electr. 
Heat 
Renewable 
Total 
Europe 
Industry 
- 1 
- 1 
+ 20 
+ 27 
+ 4 
+ 49 
12: Scenario 1 
(Mtoe) 
Transport 
+ 52 
+ 3 
+ 55 
Domestic 
+ tertiary 
-8 
-26 
+ 32 
+ 42 
+ 2 
+ 3 
+ 45 
Final 
demand 
-9 
+ 25 
+ 52 
+ 72 
+ 6 
+ 3 
+ 149 
The increase in electricity demand (72 mtoe) and 
transportation fuels (52 mtoe) accounts for over 80% 
of the additional 150 mtoe consumed annually 
between now and 2010. 
In other words, electricity is replacing mainly solid 
fuels in the industrial sector and electricity and gas 
are replacing solid fuels and oil in the residential and 
tertiary sector. Oil will continue to dominate 
transport (98%). 
There are significant variations between Member 
States. In very general terms, these differences are 
the result of, on the one hand, a swing away from 
energy intensive industries (such as steel production) 
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in the more industrially developed Member States 
while, on the other hand, those countries which 
presently have a relatively small - but growing -
number of cars per capita will have a rapidly 
increasing consumption of fuel. 
Since before the first oil crisis the Commission has 
argued strongly for substitution of oil wherever 
possible. A great deal has already been achieved and 
progress is still being made. In the field of electricity 
production, in particular, giant strides have been 
made. However, the transport sector is proving very 
resistant to change and continues to be the main 
influence accounting for close to 50% of our total 
primary oil consumption. 
The transport sector 
The sector which consumes most of our oil. A major 
source of atmospheric pollution which resists 
substitution. An area in which technology is trying to 
overcome one of the less desirable effects of increasing 
affluence, but where improvements in engine efficiency 
will be more than offset by increases in the number and 
size of vehicles and greater distances travelled. 
One of the effects of the greater disposable income in 
the Community is that more cars will appear on our 
roads. Because of increased efficiency of new cars, 
Table 2 : Traffic, energy consumption 
emission trends 
Europe 12: Scenario 1 
(Index 1985 = 
Traffic of passengers 
Inland transport 
I.Car 
2. Railway 
3. Airway 
Traffic of goods 
1. Road 
2. Railway 
3. Inland navigation 
Total (1+2 + 3) 
Energy consumption 
(transport) 
Emissions (transport) 
C02 
S02 
NOx 
1985 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100) 
1995 
142 
147 
115 
140 
139 
115 
118 
131 
131 
129 
127 
111 
2000 
151 
156 
122 
161 
152 
122 
126 
142 
135 
133 
134 
98 
& 
2010 
159 
164 
136 
208 
177 
138 
141 
164 
140 
137 
143 
100 
we expect that total fuel consumption will grow more 
slowly than the size of the car fleet. However, by 2010 
close to 130 mtoe of fuel - over 55% of the fuel 
consumed in the transport sector, one-third of our 
oil - will be burned in motor cars every year. 
Figure 3 
Transport indicators 
Car ownership 
6 0 0 
500 -
400 -
300 ■ 
200 -
100 -
o -
Cars per 1000 
301 
\$2s^ 
1 1 1— 
inhabitants 
JJJ^ 
— ι — 
m ^ 
—ι 
423^ 
H — 
EUROPE 12 
'ΰ--
— ι — 
515 
— 1 1 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Evolution of goods traffic 
Index 1985=100 
I I Railway BSSS3 Road l\WM Inland navigation —H_ Total 
Evolution of passenger traffic 
Index 1985=100 
1985 
1 1 Cor 
1990 1995 2O00 2005 2010 
BssaS Railway P\\\N Airway °~ Tot.Inland transport 
In the road freight sector, higher load factors and 
technical progress to reduce unit consumption by 
between 25% and 30% will restrain growth in fuel 
demand. 
While there could well be a substantial increase in the 
number of passengers carried by air transport - and 
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in the number of kilometres flown - this is expected 
to be somewhat offset by the jet fuel savings per 
passenger. Replacement of existing fleet by higher 
capacity, more economic aircraft, combined with 
higher occupancy rates, could almost halve unit 
consumption by aircraft over the 25 year period. 
We will still be burning enormous quantities of oil for 
transport - over 20% more than now - with all that 
this implies for our atmosphere. Breaking the link 
between transport requirements and oil consumption 
is perhaps the greatest energy challenge facing us 
today. 
Electricity generation 
A sector growing in importance, competition - and 
controversy. A fuel viewed as environmentally benign 
when it is being used - but not when it is being 
produced. An area in which there are several options 
for the decision-makers but one in which there is a 
marked reluctance to make the major decisions which 
need to be taken. 
During the last 15 years the demand for electricity 
has grown faster than that for all other fuels. It has 
often grown in close proportion to - though faster 
than - the rate of economic growth (GDP). 
Because of the importance of this sector a special 
study7 was undertaken to understand better the range 
of options which could result from the uncertainties 
on the future structure and level of demand, and the 
often difficult fuel choice decisions which would 
determine the investments to be made. This provided 
a detailed background when undertaking the 2010 
analysis. 
Following the logic of this conventional wisdom 
scenario, the annual demand for electricity could 
grow by an average 2% over the period to 2010 but 
again growth to the mid-1990's is likely to be higher 
than the average long-run rate (3% p.a.). Increased 
electricity would represent about half of the 
incremental final demand between 1987 and 2010. 
Industry accounts for 36% of this additional demand 
with the tertiary/domestic sector absorbing 58%. 
Electricity production would need to increase by 
1000 Twh from 1650 Twh in 1987 to meet this 
demand. While coal and nuclear will continue to be 
the major source of inputs of this production (85% in 
2010) oil burn could increase from 36 mtoe in 1987 to 
56 mtoe in 1995, falling back to 21 mtoe in 2010. This 
7 The Medium- and Long-Term Outlook for the European 
Electricity Sector: ESAP 
reflects the reluctance of utilities to invest in new 
capacity, preferring to have recourse to existing 
capacities to meet increasing demand. Gas burn 
under this scenario could rise gradually from 29 mtoe 
to 47 mtoe over the period 1987 to 2010 - an increase 
lower than its potential. 
The installed capacity in GWs could be: 
Table 3 : Installed capacity 
Europe 12: Scenario 1 
Nuclear 
Other 
Total 
1985 
90 
321 
411 
1995 2000 
112 119 
329 348 
441 467 
2010 
150 
387 
537 
There would be a steady reduction in SO2 emissions 
throughout the period as new plants equipped with 
flue gas desulphurisation are brought on line and 
existing plants are retrofitted. Unfortunately, we 
cannot say the same for NOx or CO2. 
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demand 
Increases for all fuels but oil's share decreasing slightly. 
Total primary energy demand is expected to rise in 
terms of mtoe from 1060 in 1987 to 1370 in 2010, 
suggesting a long-run rate of 1.1% p.a.. The demand 
for all fuels will increase in absolute quantities, but, in 
percentage share, that of oil is expected to decrease 
while nuclear will increase. 
Figure 8 
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The main growth area for oil will be transportation 
(increasing from 39% of oil's share of primary energy 
demand to 50% by 2010) while the growth area for 
solid fuels is expected to be power generation, with 
three-quarters of the solid fuel being burnt in power 
stations in 2010. While gas demand will increase from 
185 mtoe in 1985 to 250 mtoe in 2010, the structure of 
the demand is not predicted to change - unless more 
of it is burned in power stations. 
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The Community's indigenous energy supplies 
In the long­run, indigenous Community energy supply 
should remain constant, but the structure of this 
supply could alter with a decline of 2% and 1.7% per 
annum in coal and oil. These reductions would be 
compensated by an annual increase in nuclear's 
contribution by 2.5% and the development of new 
and renewable sources (5% p.a.). However, in 
volume terms, nuclear could add 100 mtoe while the 
net contribution of renewables would account for 4 
mtoe. Statistically, however, the contribution of 
renewable energy is very substantially under­
estimated, because much of it is not put on the 
commercial market and thus not recorded. 
Oil production, while it is very difficult to estimate 
because it depends not only on physical factors but 
also on price levels, could reduce gradually from 150 
mtoe in 1987 to 125 (1995) to 110 mtoe in 2010. 
Recent announcements about the UK North Sea 
suggest that these estimates are likely to prove 
conservative and that the situation in the mid­90s 
might not be too different from that of today. 
However, the situation for solids production is more 
difficult. Lignite is likely to remain steady at today's 
levels but coal and peat will more than likely decline 
steadily over the period. Overall solids seem likely to 
decline by 60 mtoe to 110 mtoe in 2010. 
The outlook for gas contrasts somewhat with that for 
oil and coal. Indigenous production will rise steadily 
to about 135 mtoe for 1995/ 2000 period and on 
present thinking decline to 120 mtoe in 2010 ­
10 mtoe lower than today. However this apparent 
decline may not occur and one could see a 
continuation of current levels into the new century. 
Major themes 
Four major themes emerge from this conven­
tional look at energy futures for the Community. 
The internal market represents a major initiative 
to put the Community on a steady growth path. 
But in achieving this increase in economic 
welfare we have to safeguard and improve the 
quality of the environment Developments in 
technology can help meet these two objectives. 
But we need also to look to the secure supply at 
moderate prices and this will be influenced by 
developments in global energy. These issues are 
now addressed 
The internal market 
The completion of the internal market will bring with it 
many economic benefits including an increase in the 
Community's GDP growth. We have made allowances 
for this in our calculations. 
In 1988, the Commission drew up an inventory of 
existing or potential obstacles to a unified European 
energy market. In order to achieve the internal 
energy market, it proposed a number of priority 
actions. These included: the removal of technical and 
fiscal barriers to trade; the application of Community 
law in energy markets; the application of the 
provisions in the Single European Act concerning 
environmental protection; and the development of 
further initiatives in the areas of energy prices and 
energy infrastructures. The implications for future 
energy growth are not clear and considerable work 
remains to be done. 
There has been much discussion on improved 
interconnections and increased trade in both the 
electricity and gas industries. This would make energy 
produced in, or traded into one country more easily 
available in another. 
The potential for further integration of the electricity 
and gas sectors are one of the policy areas the 
Commission is currently focusing on. As mentioned 
earlier, the internal market can substantially effect 
the structure of the supply companies but the extent 
of this impact can be measured only after the details 
of the proposed actions have been defined and 
adopted by the Council. This is an ongoing process 
which will require time, and the impact of which will 
be felt over the longer term. This process can be 
illustrated by looking closely at the issues raised in 
moving towards greater integration of the 
Community's electricity sector. 
■ Electricity integration 
Would the development of closer integration of the 
electricity sector impact on current longterm 
expectations? Would the impact be important, and 
would there be economic gains for the Community? 
A special report was commissioned8 to study the 
issue of electricity integration in some depth. On the 
basis of this scenario and applying 2% growth rate to 
the network comprising the Netherlands, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, France, Belgium, Spain, 
Portugal, Italy and the United Kingdom, estimates 
8 Modelling Analysis of the Electricity Sector in the Context 
of the Internal Market: Centre for Operations Research and 
Econometrics - UCL. 
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Box Β 
Impact of tax harmonization 
With the aim of evaluating the potential impact of alignment of the VAT rates and excise duties in the 
European Community on the consumer prices of energy and final energy demand, two methods of 
harmonization were considered and compared with the case of non-harmonization to the year 2000. 
Case 1 : No harmonization, the national taxation systems continue as in the past. 
Case 2 : Strict harmonization of VAT rates and excise duties. 
Case 3 : Harmonization of VAT rates and excise duties, with a single VAT rate for all fuels (normal 
rate, 15% minimum), alignment of excise duties on motor fuels at highest level, alignment of 
the excise duties on heating gasoil in an average bracket, alignment of the excise duties on 
heavy fuel oil at lowest level. 
The analysis was carried out using the results of the simulation of these three cases by the MIDAS model, 
over the period 1988-2000, for four countries (Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy). 
In Case 2, the direction of the impact on prices varies according to the country. The price variations of the 
petroleum products are often strong : 35% increase for petrol prices in Germany, 43% decrease for the 
price of heating gasoil in Italy. 
The effects on energy demands also contrast from one country to another, in. direction as well as range. 
The most significant effects are observed in Germany and in Italy, especially on the demand for oil 
products (Germany -5%, Italy +7%). These effects being in different directions means that the impact on 
the energy demand for the four countries as a whole remains moderate. 
With the exception of Italy, Case 3 generally shows rising prices for gasoline, diesel oil, and heating gasoil. 
The rise is often great (reaching a 75% of price increase for gasoline in Germany). The price of heavy fuel 
oil decreases everywhere. The price of other energy products changes little, except in the U.K. (important 
increase in VAT rates), and in Italy where the electricity prices decrease distinctly (as in Case 2). 
The demand for petroleum products decreases from 3% (France) to 7% (Germany), involving a moderate 
fall in the total energy demand. 
It should be noted that the reaction of the demand for oil products is relatively weak in regard to the 
sometimes huge price variations. 
On average, for the four countries, energy demand decreases, mainly because of the reduced demand for 
oil products. 
Impact of VA.T. rates and excise duties harmonisation 
among member states of the E.C. on final energy demand ( % of difference from Case 1 ) 
Germany 
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U.K. 
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Average 
Solids 
Oil products 
Gas 
Electricity 
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Solids 
Oil products 
Gas 
Electricity 
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Solids 
Oil products 
Gas 
Electricity 
Total 
Solids 
Oil products 
Gas 
Electricity 
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Solids 
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Electricity 
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Figure 9 : Tax Harmonisation 
Impact on final energy demand 
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were prepared showing potential gains from closer 
integration of the networks through time. The 
summary results are shown in table 4 below. 
Table 4 : Estimated annual benefits from 
greater integration 
Short term 
around 1992 
In billion ecu 1.3 
% of total 
operating costs 6% 
Medium term 
around 2000 
2.3 to 5.3 
7% to 16% 
Long term 
around 2010 
6 to 13 
12% 
These net monetary benefits include savings from 
both fuel and investment costs, yielding an 
accumulated 70 b ecu over the period (taking the 
mid­point in 2000 and 2010). 
In terms of investment saving, the benefits under the 
present practices are estimated at 13 GW to 2000. 
With greater integration there is an additional benefit 
of 12 to 15 GW. 
Taking into account the continuation of current 
practices and reinforcing these by greater integration, 
the Community's electricity park can meet growing 
electricity demand to 2000 (averaging over 2%) with 
an increase in physical capacity of under 1% p.a. 
In addition to the economic benefit above there is 
also an "external" benefit of the reduced emissions 
because of lower consumption of fossil fuels. In the 
mid­term these could be averaged out at about a five 
percent reduction in CO2, SO2 and NOx. 
Translating these "producer benefits" into reductions 
in consumer prices is a further step in the integration 
process. The direction of Commission thinking, other 
than on price transparency, will emerge over the next 
year or so. The Commission proposes a detailed 
study of the way to extend third­party access with 
Member States and sectoral interests. 
■ Harmonisation of taxes 
Harmonisation of taxes, both excise levels and VAT 
rates, is an important Community initiative which will 
have direct impact on the energy sector. In 1987 the 
Commission proposed a directive on the harmoni­
sation of petroleum product excise duties and VAT 
rates. Discussions on those proposals are in progress 
and at the time of writing (July 1989) the Commission 
has indicated possible revisions to its original 
proposals but details have not yet been decided. 
But to illustrate the importance of tax harmonisation 
the original proposals were analysed for a number of 
countries and the impacts assessed (see Box B). We 
have also thought of other possible approaches to 
taxation and these are also analysed10. 
■ Petroleum products 
Looking at some preliminary conclusions on the effects 
of the completion of the internal market for petroleum 
products and the implications for refineries, the effects 
come from cost reduction and demand generation. 
In the market for petroleum products11, the overall 
effects on refining at Community level are likely to be 
small. The competitive nature of this market and the 
rationalisation carried out in the last decade suggests 
that there is little scope for "system­wide" gains ­ the 
most efficient plants are already being utilised. 
However the removal of frontier controls will provide 
scope for significant improvement in the efficiency of 
distribution systems. Further gains can be expected 
by 1992 when the oil regimes of Spain, Portugal and 
Greece will be fully liberalised. 
The overall effects on demand will come both from 
the general increase in economic activity brought 
about by the completion of the internal market and 
from the much less important reduction in prices due 
to efficiency gains. 
The effects on relative product prices are likely to be 
stronger than the effects on the general product price 
level. Demand is constantly increasing in favour of 
the lighter distillates, and this will be intensified by 
the extra demand and increasingly stringent product 
specifications. At the same time, conversion and 
Similarly, the issues raised by greater integration of 
gas networks were also examined9. The results 
suggested that the way forward will be linked with 
market structures and with network optimization and, 
as with electricity, the direction of Commission 
thinking on these structures will only emerge later 
and can then be better analysed. 
9 Modelling Analysis of the Gas Sector In the Context of the 
Internal Market: Center of Operations Research and 
Econometrics - UCL 
10 Study of the Impact of Tax Harmonisation on Energy 
Consumption: Internal Analysis with the cooperation of 
Y. Guillaume and V. Detemmerman of DULBEA, and 
M. Lecloux of DG XVII. 
11 Analysis of the Petroleum Products Market in the Context 
of the Internal Market: R. Bacon, Oxford University. 
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upgrading refining capacity for these high quality 
products may well become tighter. Availability of 
these products in international markets is likely to be 
limited. 
Concern about possible tightness in the supply of 
motor gasoline arises also from the fact that: 
(a) the general move to unleaded gasoline as a result 
of legislation can only be achieved at satisfactory 
octane levels with some reduction in the yield of 
gasoline; 
(b) the introduction of progressively higher octane 
unleaded gasolines by the major companies, as part 
of their strategy to increase market share, further 
reduces the yield of gasoline available with existing 
technologies. 
■ Other dimensions of the internal market 
In addition to gas and electricity trade, tax harmoni­
sation and oil product trends, other aspects of both 
the general actions to achieve the single market 
(including public tendering, freeing of capital 
movements, removal of technical barriers), more 
rigorous application of some provisions of the 
Treaties (e.g. coal aids, oil monopolies) and specific 
actions under the internal energy market (price 
transparency, tariff structures) will impact on the 
energy sector through the time horizon of this 
analysis. 
Part of the impact will influence costs and consumer 
prices ­ leading in some cases to convergence of costs 
(public tendering, abolishing state monopolies) and 
prices (transparency and possible tariff structure 
proposals). Other actions will impact on actor 
behaviour (more competitive mentality) ­ subjective 
factors outside the scope of quantitative analysis. 
To some extent the switch to diesel, if it continues, 
will offset these effects, but there are also limits on 
the domestic production of diesel and these may be 
intensified if product specification legislation adopts 
the more stringent standards applicable in some 
countries. 
What is clear is that the internal energy market as it 
is gradually defined, will change the parameters of 
future energy policy structures. 
Energy and the environment 
This shift in demand mix is taking place at a time 
when demand for transportation fuels is likely to 
grow steadily (2% to 1995). The effect will be that, in 
the Community as a whole, there will be a need for 
more conversion and upgrading capacity. If public 
authorities delay defining future environmental 
standards, there could be a risk of shortage of 
adequate capacity when it is needed. 
If and when excise taxes and VAT are harmonized in 
the Community, price levels in the southern Member 
States could be lower leading to an increase in 
consumption. This would have some effect on 
refining and distribution patterns. 
The increased relative demand for lighter distillates, 
coupled with the small overall effect on the price of 
oil means that, while there is excess capacity in 
refining, the price of heavy fuel oil will face 
downward pressure. Only if national policies change 
back to encouraging the use of heavy high sulphur 
fuel oil in power generation will a ready market be 
found. This has implications for coal in that it will 
become even harder for coal to compete in this 
end­use. 
A subject which could dominate energy policy and 
planning in the years to come. This is an area in which 
technology can only achieve so much without a major 
change in our lifestyle and the ways in which we use 
our energy. Emissions of most pollutants will increase. 
The "greenhouse effect" will be a source of increasing 
concern. There is no "quick fix". 
There is a strong link between energy and the 
environment. The production and use of energy does 
generate a great deal of atmospheric pollution. In its 
Conclusion on the internal energy market in 
November 1988, the Council of Energy Ministers of 
the Community made it clear that "the achievement 
of a satisfactory balance between energy and the 
environment ­ in accordance with the Single Act ­
must constitute a major goal of the Community's 
work". 
To facilitate a better understanding of the links 
between energy production and consumption, 
emission balances have been prepared for each of the 
corresponding energy scenarios in the analysis. This 
way one may see the environmental consequence of a 
particular level or structure of consumption. The 
emission balances used are based on existing 
legislation. 
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For sulphur dioxide (SO2) a reduction of 55% is 
expected between 1987 and 2010. Emissions from 
power generation will decline by 6 million tonnes. But 
emissions from final sectors will remain constant 
­ around 4 million tonnes because, while those in the 
domestic and tertiary sector will decline, and industry 
remain broadly constant, transportation emissions 
will increase. 
Figure 10 
SO2 Emissions for Europei2 
By sector 
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Nitrogen oxides (ΝΟχ) could decline by one million 
tonnes to 8.6 million tonnes by 2010: about 12%. 
During the period there will be substantial decrease 
in the unit output, particularly for power generation 
and transport but this is compensated by increased 
activity. Overall transport emissions will decline by 
15% or so. 
Figure 11 
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Emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) could increase in 
2010 by 24% from 2.7 to 3.4 billion tonnes with power 
generation (36%) and transportation (22%) 
representing about 60% of CO2 emissions. The 
industry and domestic/tertiary sectors contribute 
16% and 19% respectively to total emissions. 
The "greenhouse effect" is coming to the fore as one 
of the major global issues. Concentrations of the 
"greenhouse gases" ­ CO2, methane CH4, nitrous 
oxide N2O, ozone O3 and chloro­fiuro­carbons CFCs 
­ are increasing due to human activities. This is 
modifying the composition of the atmosphere at an 
unprecedented rate. The thermal balance of the earth 
is being modified so global warming and associated 
climatic changes could follow. There is considerable 
uncertainty as to exactly what changes could take 
place ­ but they are likely to be important. 
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Figure 12 : 
CO2 Emissions for Europei2 
By sector 
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It has been calculated that 55% of the greenhouse 
effect is caused by CO2, 15% by methane and a 
further 5% by N2O and O3. Between 70% and 90% 
of the CO2 comes from the burning of fossil fuels. Of 
this total the power generation sector accounts today 
for about 30% of the Community's emissions of CO2. 
The Community now accounts for around 15% of the 
world's CO2 emissions. In terms of CO2 emissions 
per capita, the US and the German Democratic 
Republic lead the world with 4.9 tonnes of carbon 
each year. In the Community we have five countries 
producing between 2 and 3 t/year with the others 
below this. The world average is It/year. 
We have studied the emissions from electricity 
generating stations. However transport, for example, 
accounts for around a quarter of our CO2 emissions -
not to mention other gases and particulates. We must 
not just focus on power generation. 
In making our estimates of future energy demand we 
have taken into account in every sector the 
possibilities of technological advances which usually 
lead to more efficient use. 
The degree to which such efficient equipment enters 
the market will influence substantially the rate of 
growth in consumption. As mentioned earlier, the 
argument is not about what "could" happen as to what 
"is likely" to happen. The rate of penetration of 
efficient technology both in end use and in production 
is one of the key policy variables. 
For example, we expect a 20-30% increase in 
efficiency of car engines. The average consumption 
per 100 km in 1985 was 9.5 Utres. We expect this to 
improve to 7.5 Utres by 2000 and to 6.8 Utres by 2010. 
These numbers are conservative as "current best 
technology" (prototype) could achieve 5 Utres per 
100 km and the technology exists which could achieve 
3 Utres/100 km. However, we have to take into 
account the probability that people wUl upgrade then-
cars - i.e. change to cars with larger engine capacity -
and that the introduction of some anti-pollution 
devices could Umit energy saving. In addition the 
increasing vehicle density wiU mean more congestion 
on our roads - more traffic jams - with higher 
consumption caused by more time spent in lower 
gears. 
Heavy industry is another important area for concern. 
Table 5 below presents the view adopted in this 
scenario - a 16% improvement in specific consump-
tion in steel production with a corresponding 
decrease of 22% in cement production over the 
period 1985 to 2010. But many argue that many of the 
potential savings are already achieved and that 
further improvements are less likely, particularly with 
present fuel prices. 
Table 5 : 
Specific energy consumption 
Europe 12: Scenario 1 
Heavy Industry 
Steel Production 
toe/tonne 
Cement 
toe/tonne 
1985 
0.4 
0.09 
1995 
0.35 
0.08 
2000 
0.34 
0.08 
2010 
0.31 
0.07 
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Similar arguments could be put forward about 
domestic appliances. In the case of refrigerators, we 
expect that people will offset the advantage of lower 
energy consumption per Utre of space by buying 
bigger fridges. 
In summary, technological developments will 
continue and these wiU enter the market and impact 
on demand. However, because the improvements are 
usually incremental, their economic benefits not 
apparent, and they may themselves encourage 
increased use of the equipment in which they are 
incorporated, they will only slowly bring about a 
saving in energy demand. There is no major 
technological development on the horizon which 
could result in very large energy savings ­ at relatively 
low cost. Nor ­ with the present energy market ­ is 
there a great incentive to make the investments 
required to look for one. 
Given the importance of this question of efficiency, 
two special studies were commissioned to examine 
what the potential for both end use and production 
efficiencies and the rate at which these might 
penetrate into the market. This scenario does foresee, 
particularly after 1995, a strong growth in energy 
efficiency ­ twice the current rate of increase. 
Energy security 
If the resources exist and can be produced in 
sufficient quantities to meet demand, what needs to 
be said about supply of energy resources to the 
Community? The answer depends on the individual 
fuel, but we wiU need to consider if supplies will 
actually be available to us and at what price. 
This raises the issue of security of supply, which, 
especiaUy since 1973, has been a central theme of any 
developed or developing country's energy policy. The 
Community is a net importer of energy. Only one of 
our Member States, the U.K., is a net exporter. There 
is no possibility in the foreseeable future that the 
Community wiU be energy independent. 
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s we reduced 
our dependence on imported energy by reducing our 
dependence on imported oil so that by 1985 our net 
oil imports were below 32% of our total energy 
consumption and our total energy imports only a little 
over 43%. Even then, we were importing nearly 70% 
of our oil ­ and over 30% of both our coal and gas. 
Now aU the percentages have started to slowly 
increase and the Community's import dependence 
will continue to rise throughout the period under 
study ­ for aU fuels. By the mid­90's we may be 
importing over 50% of our energy ­ about 650 mtoe. 
By the end of century we could be importing 450 
mtoe of oil (85% of our needs), 150 mtoe of coal 
(56% of needs) and 110 mtoe of gas (45%) ­ and the 
volumes will continue to grow ­ leaving imports by 
2010 at just under 60% of total primary energy 
requirements. 
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Figure 13: Call on imports 
Europe! 2: Scenario 1 
When looking to the future, perceptions about energy 
resources are important. In the 1970s "conventional 
wisdom" suggested imminent depletion of energy 
resources. In the 1980s the common perception is of 
no physical resource scarcity well into the new 
century. Views on resources are important and in 
preparing this report a special review was 
commissioned which looked in detail at current 
expectations for coal, oil, gas and uranium. 
Linked to the issue of resources is the cost and 
market price of oil. While coal may indeed develop 
substantially as a world trade commodity all the 
indications are that oil will remain the leading price 
indicator. 
Views about future oil prices have always differed 
and current perceptions about prices which could 
prevail over the next twenty years respect this 
tradition. Yet the range of oil prices in current debate 
are lower than those suggested in the early 1980's ­
then influenced no doubt by the recent experience of 
USD 40 oil in 1979/80. An overview of current 
thinking would suggest that prices will remain volatile 
but with, in the medium term, a return to pre­1986 
prices unlikely. Equally a "low" price in single digit 
figures is not expected. 
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Table 6 : World Oil Market - 3 Scenarios 
in mbd 
CONSUMPTION 
OECD 
LDCs 
TOTAL 
SUPPLY 
NON OPEC 
Processing gains 
CPEs-Net exports 
OPEC 
(of which: Crude) 
TOTAL 
Stock changes 
1985 
34.4 
12.4 
46.8 
25.6 
1.1 
1.8 
17.5 
16.0 
46.0 
-0.8 
1988 
36.9 
13.9 
50.8 
26.0 
1.1 
2.2 
21.4 
19.6 
50.7 
-0.1 
1990 
38.0 
15.0 
53.0 
26.5 
1.2 
2.1 
23.3 
21.5 
53.1 
0.1 
1995 
Seen 1 
39.8 
17.5 
57.3 
27.3 
1.2 
1.5 
27.4 
25.5 
57.3 
0 
1995 
Seen 2/3 
41.0 
17.6 
58.5 
27.3 
1.2 
1.5 
28.5 
26.6 
58.5 
0 
2010 
Seen 1 
39.4 
23.5 
62.8 
26.8 
1.3 
0.0 
34.7 
32.5 
62.8 
0 
2010 
Seen 2 
40.6 
22.9 
63.5 
27.8 
1.3 
0.0 
34.4 
32.2 
63.5 
0 
2010 
Seen 3 
35.7 
21.4 
57.1 
26.7 
1.3 
0.0 
29.1 
26.9 
57.1 
0 
While there is no consensus, two distinct schools of 
thought can be discerned; one argues prices in the 
USD 25 - USD 30 range by 2000 (largely supported 
by institutional economists) whUe the other view is of 
prices in the USD 15 - USD 20 range (prices in 
1987/8 terms in both cases) and this view tends to be 
supported by those closer to the oil markets. 
While price levels are important so also is the 
fluctuation of prices and the resulting uncertainties 
caused by major swings. Over the longer-term the 
magnitude of price movements depends both on the 
extent to which supply and demand growth ratio 
diverge and the sensitivity of the system to these 
imbalances. 
The potential for price instability in oil continues to 
exist although its importance will change as the 
supply/demand picture changes for other fuels. 
But we have a reasonable diversification of fuels and 
fuel suppliers, we have in place poUcies to reduce the 
impact of any interruptions and we have stocks of 
fuel. Moreover, we have good and improving 
relations with most of our suppliers to whom we are a 
major, or the major, trading partner and there is an 
increasing amount of industrial investment in the 
Community by some of the larger producers. So while 
supply security must remain a major part of 
Community energy policy - especially with growing 
dependence on external suppliers - we should 
continue to encourage better relations with our 
trading partners. 
Community demand in a 
global context 
The Community's primary energy consumption will 
grow at the same rate as that of the rest of the 
developed world but will be much slower than in 
developing countries. We are entering a new era - one 
in which the energy consumption of the developing and 
Centrally Planned Economies countries become the 
major factor in energy demand. 
The arguments about the oil price should of course 
be undertaken in a global context. World supply and 
demand together with geopolitics are the actors 
which on the world's stage determine the drama of oil 
prices. Looking at a possible futures for oil, and 
following the logic of this scenario the world balance 
might resemble the foUowing: 
Under this view of the market, call on OPEC grows 
steadily to 28 mbd by 2000 and to about 35 mbd by 
2010. Is such a market for OPEC oil consistent with 
the price of USD 30 a barrel in 2010 (1987 
prices)12 '13·14? This subject is taken up again in 
Chapter 3. 
12 
13 
14 
World Oil Supply and Demand Outlook: Internal analysis, 
N. Deimezis. 
World Energy Supply and Demand Outlook: Internal 
analysis, N. Deimezis, J. Neto and M. Camos. 
World Economic Outlook to 2005: CISI Wharton, 1986. 
World energy 
supply and demand 
We have estimated world energy consumption (in-
cluding non-commercial energies) at about 7,800 mtoe. 
The Community share is 14% of the total, but the 
Community's nuclear park represents one-third of 
world nuclear capacity. The corresponding share of the 
US is 27%. 
for 25% in 2010 (today 20%). Their consumption 
may increase from 1,500 mtoe to 3,500 mtoe; that for 
CPE's from 2,500 mtoe to 4,700 mtoe. 
The fuel mix will change also with gas replacing oil 
(gas today represents 19% and could rise to 26%; 
that for oil is currently 37%, decUning to 30%). 
Essentially the share of soUds and nuclear wiU remain 
constant. 
By region, OECD accounts for just under 50% of 
total world energy, centraUy planned economies 
about 30% and developing countries 20%. By fuels, 
the CPE's are heavily dependent on solids (50%) with 
LDC's dependent on non-commercial fuels (2/3 of 
world supply) and oil (which represents 55% of their 
commercial energy supply). 
Looking to the future, world energy demand could 
grow by 2.2%/year to 2010, increasing consumption 
from 7,800 mtoe to 13,500 mtoe. OECD's growth rate 
will probably be half of that for the world, resulting in 
its share of world consumption decUning from 50% to 
40% in 2010. The developing countries will account 
Carbon emissions seem likely to rise by 4 billion 
tonnes between 1987 and 2010. While the 
Community's share declines in percentage terms 
from 12% to 9%, in absolute terms annual emissions 
could grow from 740 to 930 mifUon tones. (In terms 
of CO2 this is an increase from 2.7 bilUon tonnes 
today to 3.4 biUion tonnes in 2010). 
By world region, centraUy planned economies' 
emissions could equal those of OECD (at 3.6 billion 
tonnes) in 2010, while those from the LDCs could 
more than double from 1.2 to just under 2.8 billion 
tonnes. In aU, carbon emissions could increase by 
60% over the period to 2010. 
Table 7 : 
Mtoe 
EUROPE-12 
USA 
Rest of OECD 
OECD 
CPE 
LDC 
WORLD 
Part of EUROPE-12 
in Total World in % 
(1) Including bunkers 
(2) Including geothermal and 
(3) Including non-commercia 
Solids 
239.0 
440.5 
156.1 
835.6 
1019.8 
234.1 
2089.5 
11.4 
1985 - World Primary Energy Consumption 
in 
Oil(1) 
489.2 
721.7 
378.1 
1589.0 
658.1 
640.1 
2887.2 
16.9 
net electricity Imports 
energy 
Sources: CEC-SOEC, CEC-DG XVII/A2, 
Millions of Toe 
Gas 
184.7 
449.4 
103.6 
737.7 
569.1 
167.9 
1474.7 
Í2.5 
BP, OECD, IEA, UN 
Nuclear 
Í23.6 
102.9 
81.0 
307.5 
54.4 
16.5 
378.4 
32.7 
Hydro(2) 
42.7 
65.6 
148.1 
256.4 
92.1 
107.0 
455.5 
9.4 
Other(3) 
1.7 
66.5 
8.4 
76.6 
93.9 
331.5 
502.0 
0.3 
TOTAL 
1080.9 
1846.6 
875.3 
3802.8 
2487.4 
1497.1 
7787.3 
13.9 
TOTAL in % 
13.9 
23.7 
11.2 
48.8 
31.9 
19.2 
100.0 
Energy in Europe 
Table 8 : 
1985-2010 World primary energy demand and CO21 
A. Primary energy demand 
in Mtoe 
EUROPE 12 
USA 
CANADA 
JAPAN 
Rest of OECD 
TOTAL OECD 
CPE 
LDC 
WORLD 
Part of EUROPE-12 
in Total World in % 
1985 
1080.9 
1846.6 
234.1 
373.3 
267.9 
3802.8 
2487.5 
1497.0 
7787.3 
13.9 
1987 
7 7 76.9 
1904.0 
241.0 
378.9 
301.5 
3942.3 
2636.6 
1609.1 
8188.0 
73.6 
1995 
1282.9 
2198.6 
289.1 
464.0 
354.3 
4588.9 
3323.9 
2164.7 
10077.5 
72.7 
1995/87 
% 
7.7 
7.8 
2.3 
2.6 
2.0 
1.9 
2.9 
3.8 
2.6 
2000 
1334.8 
2335.3 
314.1 
500.9 
374.4 
4859.5 
3784.8 
2560.3 
11204.6 
77.9 
2000/95 
% 
0.8 
1.2 
1.7 
7.5 
7.7 
1.2 
2.6 
3.4 
2.1 
amissions 
2010 
7434.7 
2578.0 
357.2 
568.1 . 
408.7 
5346.1 
4777.8 
3500.5 
13564.4 
70.6 
2010/00 
% 
0.7 
1.0 
1.3 
1.3 
0.9 
1.0 
2.2 
3.2 
1.9 
2010/87 
% 
7.7 
7.3 
7.7 
7.8 
7.3 
1.3 
2.6 
3.4 
2.2 
B. C 0 2 Emissions 
in Mt of C 
EUROPE 12 
USA 
CANADA 
JAPAN 
Rest of OECD 
TOTAL OECD 
CPE 
LDC 
WORLD 
Part of EUROPE-12 
in Total World in % 
1985 
747 
7355 
720 
267 
753 
2630 
2112 
1213 
5955 
72.4 
1987 
746 
1395 
122 
260 
180 
2703 
2228 
7299 
6230 
72.0 
1995 
854 
7602 
144 
310 
220 
3130 
2708 
1730 
7568 
11.3 
1995/87 
% 
7.7 
7.7 
2.7 
2.2 
2.5 
1.9 
2.5 
3.6 
2.5 
2000 
886 
7776 
160 
321 
238 
3321 
3022 
2034 
8377 
70.6 
2000/95 
% 
0.7 
1.4 
2.1 
0.7 
1.6 
1.2 
2.2 
3.3 
2.1 
2010 
928 
1915 
184 
343 
281 
3651 
3646 
2775 
10072 
9.2 
2010/00 
% 
0.5 
1.1 
1.4 
0.7 
1.7 
1.0 
7.9 
3.2 
1.9 
2010/87 
% 
7.0 
7.4 
7.8 
7.2 
2.0 
1.3 
2.2 
3.4 
2.1 
Note: Includes non-commercial energy 
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BOX C 
Scenario 2 ­ «Driving into tensions» 
Objective : 
To demonstrate that high economic growth without appropriate poücy measures and only based on market 
mechanisms will drive the system into a situation where supply capacities are under pressure (supply gaps 
and price shocks) and polluting emissions will attain high levels. 
Definition : 
1. International situation 
■ Energy prices (1987 US dollars): 
OU USD 20/bbl in 1995; USD 26.5/bbl in 2000 and USD 40/bbl in 2010. 
Gas slight decoupling with oU up to 2000 and indexed to coal thereafter. 
Coal USD 55/tce in 1995; USD 65/tce in 2000 and USD 70/tce in 2010. 
■ Economic outlook, GDP: 
World at 4.0% average annual growth from 1990 to 2000 and 2.8 % from 2000 to 2010. 
CPEs at 3.0% average annual growth from 1990 to 2000 and 2.5 % from 2000 to 2010. 
LDCs at 4.5% average annual growth from 1990 to 2000 and 3.5 % from 2000 to 2010. 
OECD at 3.5% average annual growth from 1990 to 2000 and 2.6 % from 2000 to 2010. 
2. European Community 
■ Internal market: Important macroeconomic effect leading to about 1 % higher GDP growth rate 
than in Scenario 1. However, this increase in the growth rate is not only the result of a successful 
internal market but also of a better international situation. On the other hand, due to high energy 
prices (driven by higher energy demand levels) the economic situation deteriorates after 2000 with a 
faU of economic growth to a rate sUghtly below of that of Scenario 1. 
■ GDP : 3.5% average annual growth from 1990 to 2000, and 2.5 % from 2000 to 2010. 
■ Sectors: 
Industry relaunch of energy­intensive industries (chemicals, steel, non­metalic) up to 2000 and 
stability after; rest of industries (speciaUy equipment goods) with more growth. 
Tertiary simUar growth rates as for industry. 
Domestic 3.0% average annual growth untU 2000; 2% from 2000 to 2010. 
3. Energy­related aspects 
■ Technology: Same as in Scenario 1 but faster penetration due to more new capacity requirements; 
more opportunities for innovation and new products. 
■ Behaviour: From 1990 to 2000 "no concern" approach leading to a partial loss of theoretical gains 
brought by technology; after 2000 as in Scenario 1 due to prices. No energy management especially in 
transport up to 2000. 
4. Policy aspects 
■ Energy internal market: Given the global philosophy of the scenario (important economic impact), a 
more integrated energy market is assumed : 
­ fiscal harmonisation (details yet to be defined); 
­ fuU convergence of pre­tax fuel prices; 
­ liberalisation of electricity and gas trade which results in a rationalisation of the respective supply 
systems; 
­ convergence of investment costs as result of public procurement directive and free capital 
movements and access. 
■ Environment: Application of Community legislation; this could lead to a serious constraint on the 
energy demand and supply system (balance and fuel mix) given the system's very high levels of 
emissions. 
■ Energy: No special concern on energy, allowing market forces to drive the whole system within the 
existing policy framework (return to high prices will tend to slow down demand). 
Chapter 3 
A conventional view oí the Suture revisited 
or «how things could go wrong» - Scenario 2 
Introduction 
If we had higher economic growth with heavy 
industry continuing to play an important role, and if 
we over-estimated the improvements in energy 
intensities in Scenario 1 (which after 1995 are buUish) 
then combined with growing transport congestion the 
results of the "conventional wisdom" scenario would 
underestimate the level of energy consumption. 
WhUe energy efficiency could, from a technical view 
point, continue to improve, and probably accelerate, 
because of the increase in economic activity, its net 
penetration into the market could be less than we 
thought. In the transport sector, for example, traffic 
conditions could be such that the actual use of higher 
efficiency vehicles would yield specific consumption 
rates far above their engineering potential. Replacing 
old cars with new, but larger-cylinder cars, could 
more than offset the engineering efficiencies gained 
in the design of the new car fleet. This "trading-up 
factor" linked to deteriorating traffic conditions both 
in towns and on major highways could more than 
compensate for technical improvements leading to 
higher consumption in the transport sector than 
foreseen. Emission abatement techniques are also 
likely to increase specific consumption. 
«Driving into tensions» 
Scenario 
During the initial round of contacts with experts, 
there was evidence that perhaps economic growth 
could increase faster, and for more sustained periods, 
than prevailing wisdom might suggest. Looking back 
over the past three decades there has indeed been a 
number of cycles; between 1961 and 1973 growth 
increased at just under 5%. But of course during the 
oU shock periods of 1974-1986 economic growth was 
down to about 2% per annum. However, since 1986 
growth is running at 3% p.a. 
Indeed, some economic leaders argue that we are 
now entering a new growth cycle and, even if they do 
not foresee growth of the same order as that of the 
1960s, they believe it should be higher than the 2% 
experienced in the recent period. We have taken for 
this scenario a growth rate of 3.5%, running from 
1990 to 2000 but falling to 2Vi% from then to 2010. 
Is this a plausible assumption; under what conditions 
would it prevail? The internal market is certainly 
capable of generating stronger economic growth in 
the Community and the international trading 
consequence of this growth, together with an 
improvement in world trading conditions could 
indeed lead to a higher level of world economic 
growth, ranging at around 4% as against 3.2% 
assumed earlier. There would indeed be 
consequences for developing countries and, to be 
coherent, growth in these countries would average 
about 4.5% from 1990 to 2000, declining sUghtly to 
y/i% from 2000 to 2010. For OECD as a whole, the 
average would be 3.5%, falling in the later period to 
just over 2/2%. 
Within the Community the internal market could 
generate another 1% GDP growth. From a sectoral 
point of view it does assume some continuation of 
existing high levels of output from energy intensive 
industries, e.g., chemicals, steel and non-metaUic 
production, and this might continue during the 1990s, 
stabiUzing towards the beginning of the new century. 
The tertiary sector would of course continue to 
develop, as indeed would the domestic sector with 
higher disposable income being available. 
Energy use behaviour from 1990 to 2000 would 
probably see a continuation of a "no concern" 
attitude, leading to a partial, if not a large loss of the 
potential efficiency gains available from the 
introduction of more technically-efficient equipment. 
In the transport sector, the modal split between the 
different forms of transport would remain essentially 
the same - primarily favouring the private car. There 
would be no new initiatives or major change in traffic 
management; rather a continuation of existing 
policies which, while providing for some im-
provement in transportation flows, would most Ukely 
be insufficient to solve urban congestion problems. 
Thus market forces drive the system. But of course a 
return to higher oil prices would tend to slow down 
demand, particularly towards the first decade of the 
21st century. 
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Energy consequences 
Simulating the energy sector, in response to the 
economic framework outlined in this scenario, 
suggests that primary energy demand could grow at 
about 1.7% p.a. with the final sectors growing at 
about 1.4% p.a.. This compares with 1% and 0.6% 
respectively in the "conventional wisdom" scenario. 
The profile through time of aU of these various 
growth rates would be faster to the mid-1990s -
primary energy demand in this period growing 
annuaUy at 2.5%, slowing in the later period to 1.2%. 
Power generation could grow by 3.5% to the 
mid-1990s, slowing down later to 2.6% to give an 
average for the fuU period of 3%. 
By sector, transport would grow at about 1.4% and 
would add 75 toe to the incremental demand of 264 
mtoe this scenario requires over 1987 levels of 
consumption. Similarly, industry, with a growth rate 
of 1.5%, would add under 90 mtoe. The domestic and 
tertiary sector would add another 100 mtoe to 
incremental demand. 
Table 9 : Incremental final energy 
Solids 
Oil 
Gas 
Electr. 
Heat 
Renewable 
Total 
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Industry 
+ 1 
+37 
+ 46 
+ 4 
+ 88 
(Mtoe) 
Transport 
+72 
+ 3 
+ 75 
Domestic 
+tertiary 
-8 
-20 
+ 61 
+62 
+ 3 
+ 3 
+ 101 
Rnal 
demand 
- 7 
+ 52 
+ 98 
+ 111 
+ 7 
+ 3 
+ 264 
The incremental increase in primary energy demand 
of about 500 mtoe would be suppUed from an 
increase in soUds of 170 mtoe, with oU, gas and 
nuclear increasing by the order of 60, 130 and 125 
mtoe respectively. Power generation would account 
for 195 of the 500 additional mtoe required to meet 
incremental primary energy demand. 
On a per capita basis, consumption would increase 
from 2.2 toe to 3 toe by 2010 in final demand. Energy 
intensity would, however, continue to improve, but at 
a sUghtly slower rate and could register an 
improvement of 32% as against 35% in scenario 1. 
The caU on imports would rise, with under 60% of all 
fuel consumed being imported by 2000. This 
compares with 54% in the first scenario. By this year 
some 70% of coal, 76% of oil and 60% of gas would 
be imported. The long-run growth rate in imports wiU 
be running at 1.2% p.a. over the period to 2010. 
Figure 14 : 
Primary Energy Demand 
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Transportation could also experience a very fast 
growth, up to 3% to the mid-1990s, decUning 
subsequently to much more modest rates. Given also 
the emphasis on heavy industry, industrial 
consumption might also show very strong growth in 
the initial period (around 2%), slowing in the later 
period to just 1% p.a. 
The scenario does foresee improvements in energy 
intensities for coal, oU and gas, both in the primary 
energy and final sector requirements. 
The long-run improvements in intensity for primary 
and final demand are -1.4% and -1.7% respectively. 
With the faster economic growth resulting from this 
scenario assumption it is clear that car fleets, as 
indeed the capital stock of equipment in other 
sectors, wiU be renewed more quickly than under a 
slower growth rate. SimUarly, the scenario has the 
dynamic element inbuilt, whereby technology does 
continue to improve. 
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The transport sector 
While technological improvements will take place a 
change will also be required in transport infra-
structure if the technical potentials are to be realized 
in practice. Taking three countries, Belgium, Spain 
and Portugal, as an example, the studies show that 
through better car technology an improvement in 
energy consumption of between 6 and 8% over the 
period could be expected (here it is assumed that 
performance was improved 10-15%). But if traffic 
management (better infrastructure, signalling etc.) 
did not accompany and support better car technology, 
then the consumption gains would be substantiaUy 
reduced - by an order of 40% in the period 
1995-2000. 
Table 10 : Lost Potential 
Belgium/Spain/Portugal 
i) Better car technology 
ii) But without improved 
traffic management 
iii) Leading to a loss of 
potential efficiency gains 
1995 
-6% 
-3V4% 
40% 
2000 
-7% 
-4% 
43% 
2015 
-8% 
-6% 
25% 
Efficiency improvements on their own wiU not be 
sufficient to realize the full engineering potential. In 
this case transportation infrastructure and its 
management has an important role to play in 
achieving lower specific consumption of the vehicle 
fleet. SimUarly, the situation may be repeated in 
industry, where new technology (e.g., heat pumps) 
are introduced. But unless the environment within 
which they are placed, in terms of servicing and skills, 
develop simultaneously then the engineering potential 
will be lost in these sectors also. 
demand in the early 1990s. Should the demand be 
higher, planners would need additional capacity for 
the mid-1990s, a capacity perhaps justified if they 
believed that the medium-term pressures would 
continue for the Ufe of the asset. 
But there is uncertainty about demand levels over the 
longer term. Even within this scenario's logic, the 
longer-run growth rate in the latter period of the 
analysis is substantially below the early growth 
anticipated. Consequently, there is a danger that by 
responding to medium-term demand pressures, long-
term spare capacity could be created. This is without 
a major decUne in electricity demand over the longer 
period. 
During earlier discussions with utiUties, two issues 
were dominant. The first related to the long-term 
growth rate in electricity, with German electricians 
suggesting that this would be, in historic terms, very 
modest. Nonetheless, many utiUties were facing 
higher growth rates during the 1980s than they had 
anticipated and while the long-term thinking 
explained in the German situation was echoed by 
other planners, the pressures during the 1980s and 
those foreseen in the early 1990s raise doubts about 
the level and shape of future demand patterns. 
Compounding these uncertainties on the demand side 
are concerns regarding supply side preferences. 
Clearly, the nuclear option in the 1990s wUl not be 
one available to many of the utUities concerned. 
Other fuel choices also pose difficulties. Concern with 
SO2 and CO2 cast a shadow over the coal choice. 
Similarly, the attractiveness of gas as a fuel wUl be 
offset by questions as to the cost and contract terms 
which might be available for the supply of this fuel to 
the power generating sector. 
The table below estimates the generating capacity 
implied by this scenario and compares it with that in 
Scenario 1. 
Electricity generation 
The impUcations for power generation of higher 
economic growth, and sustained output in the heavy 
industrial sector, would be very important. The long-
run growth rate might be of the order of 3% but with 
higher rates of growth to the mid-1990s - perhaps 
3/2%, falling in the latter period to just over 2.20%. 
Gross production could increase from 1650 to 3100 
TWh. Electricity planners would be placed in a 
dUemma. 
There is existing spare capacity and in Scenario 1 it is 
an important source of supply in meeting additional 
Table 11 : 
Total electricity generating capacities 
inGW 
1987 1995 
Scenario 1 411 441 
Scenario 2 411 455 
Additional capacity 0 14 
2000 2010 
467 537 
527 640 
60 103 
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The Community's energy 
supplies 
EssentiaUy, the additional supplies required to meet 
the increase in demand will come from imports with 
net imports of solids in the order of 280 mtoe, oil 530 
and gas 145 mtoe in 2000. 
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Internal Market 
Given the important impacts of increased economic 
growth a more integrated market could be facilitated. 
The air of optimism and budgetary flexibility resulting 
from higher economic activity would most probably 
assist fuUer implementation of the internal market. 
Fuel input costs would tend to converge with tax 
harmonisation (although the details have not yet been 
defined) and with the growing role of imports as the 
source of additional supply, i.e., prices are 
determined on the world market. This convergence 
on the supply side could be matched on the demand 
side with greater transparency of prices and with 
liberalisation of existing monopolies, leading overaU 
to more convergence in end-user prices than exists 
today. The result could be some rationalization in the 
supply systems. Similarly, convergence of investment 
costs could result from the implementation of the 
pubUc procurement directive, and this, linked to 
freeing of capital movements, could act as an 
incentive towards capital cost convergence. 
Energy and the environment 
Under this scenario, annual CO2 emissions are likely 
to increase substantiaUy from 2.7 billion tonnes in 
1987 to 4 bUUon tonnes in 2010. The difference 
between emissions for Scenario 1 and 2 in 2010 would 
be 600 million tonnes of CO2. Of this net difference 
between the two scenarios, power generation would 
account for 350 million tonnes, transports 60 million 
tonnes and industry 60 million tonnes. 
Technology improvement and energy saving 
It is clear that with higher economic growth there is 
much more probabiUty of faster turnover of capital 
stock. Given the normal evolution in improved 
technical features in, for example, cars, refrigerators, 
televisions, etc., these should penetrate the markets 
more quickly than with the level of economic activity 
envisaged in Scenario 1. 
Even if the technical efficiency improves, the 
behaviour of users and the comfort levels sought are 
not expected to change in comparison to that under 
the "conventional wisdom" scenario. If anything, 
because the ratio between relative price increases, 
and relative increase in income is likely to move in 
favour of the latter, the end-user is probably more 
indifferent to energy savings. The comfort levels 
sought, the trading-up to the next level of equipment, 
and the lack of attention to energy savings as such, 
suggests that, notwithstanding the engineering 
efficiency gains, the actual gains in use will decline. 
Indeed the analysis suggests that these engineering 
gains wiU be offset by behaviour and comfort level 
requirements. 
Thus, as for Scenario 1, the full potential from 
existing know-how is unlikely to be realized under 
such an economic environment. 
Energy security 
The increase in consumption associated with this 
scenario, "driving into tensions", puts the greatest 
pressure on the energy security dimension and 
particularly that for oil. At world level, incremental 
demand for oil could rise by 14 mbd (for the 
Community the corresponding increase is 1 mbd). 
The call on imports of aU fuels could increase the 
Community import dependency from just over 40% 
to nearly 60%. 
Figure 15 
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Non-OPEC supply, which is largely exogenous up to 
2000 (depending on decisions already made), 
increases between 1 mbd and 2 mbd to 2000, and only 
by 0.5 mbd by 2010. But this might be an under-
estimate of the longer term non-OPEC possibilities. 
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Conclusion 
Higher energy consumption L· plausible - and indeed a real possibility. The current underlying growth in 
consumption could lead to the high levels of demand which are suggested here for 1995. This 
consumption is driven by economic forces, with, in the medium term, little or no policy restraint. 
Emission levels will rise and will fuel the controversy about the polluting nature of energy production. 
Pressure on world oil prices must increase. Of course this does not automatically mean another oil 
shock but the trading system is exposed should the political environment sour. 
Finally, perhaps the most disappointing result would be the failure to benefit from the real technical 
progress made in recent years - letting energy wastage continue. 
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BOX D 
Scenario 3 ­ «Sustaining high economie growth» 
Objective : 
To demonstrate that sustained high economic growth is not in conflict with strict environmental standards 
and that both objectives can be achieved within a secure energy future through mastering both energy 
consumption (more efficiency via technological innovation and improved consumer behaviour, such as 
through traffic management) and more efficient means of production. 
Definition : 
1. International situation 
■ Energy prices (1987 US dollars): 
Oil USD 20/bbl in 1995; USD 25 in 2000; USD 20/bbl in 2010; 
Gas same as Scenario 2 but more decoupling; 
Coal USD 50/tce inl995; USD 60/tce in 2000 and USD 50/tce in 2010. 
■ Economic outlook, GDP: 
World at 4.0% average annual growth from 1990 to 2000 and 3.5% from 2000 to 2010; 
CPEs at 3.0% average annual growth from 1990 to 2000 and 2.7% from 2000 to 2010; 
LDCs at 4.5% average annual growth from 1990 to 2000 and 4.0% from 2000 to 2010; 
OECD at 3.5% average annual growth from 1990 to 2000 and 3.0% from 2000 to 2010. 
2. European Community 
■ Internal market: Important macroeconomic effect leading to about 1 % higher GDP growth rate 
than in Scenario 1. However, this increase in the growth rate is not only the result of a successful 
internal market but also of a better international situation. Because a 3.5 % per year GDP growth 
rate could lead to some tensions there is a slight slow down after 2000 to 3 % per year. 
■ GDP : 3.5% average annual growth from 1990 to 2000 and 3.0% from 2000 to 2010. 
■ Sectors: 
Industry same as Scenario 2 until 1995; between 1995 and 2010 stability of energy­intensive 
branches and sustained growth of others (mainly equipment goods and speciaUsed 
chemicals); 
Tertiary same as Scenario 2 until 1995; between 1995 and 2010 tertiary continues to grow 
(compensating the slow down in industry); 
Domestic 3.0% average annual growth until 2000; 2.5% from 2000 to 2010. 
3. Energy­related aspects 
■ Technology: Until 1992 as in Scenario 2; due to policy decisions taken as of 1992, strong innovation 
in equipment and high capital turn­over leading to more economic and energy efficiency. 
■ Behaviour: UntU 1992 as in Scenario 2; due to policy decisions taken as of 1992 as weU as new 
available technologies (more efficient equipment) and better infrastructures (more and better roads 
and traffic management), consumer behaviour will tend towards more rational behaviour nothwith­
standing higher incomes. 
4. Policy aspects 
■ Energy internal market: Given the global philosophy of the scenario (important economic impact), a 
more integrated energy market is assumed : 
­ fiscal harmonisation (details yet to be defined); 
­ full convergence of pre­tax fuel prices; 
­ liberalisation of electricity and gas trade which results in a rationalisation of the respective supply 
systems; 
­ convergence of investment costs as result of public procurement directive and free capital move­
ments and access. 
In addition, there is full implementation of a common energy policy which sustains high economic 
growth. 
■ Environment: Application of Community legislation until 1992; due to policy decisions taken as of 
1992 much stricter environmental standards will be implemented thus restraining the possibUities for 
a merely market­oriented expansion of the energy demand and supply system (balance and fuel mix). 
■ Energy: After 1992 special focus on energy policy with emphasis on: 
­ stricter environmental regulations; 
­ stricter and mandatory technological gains as well as encouragement of rational use; 
­ diversification of fuels avoiding oil but more use of gas, relaunch of nuclear after 2000, new 
technologies on end use and production. 
Chapter 4 
Another view - Sustaining high economic growth 
in a clean environment - Scenario 3 
Scenarios 1 and 2 develop energy futures axed on a 
conventional approach. This is not a static view ­ the 
expectations from technology are great. But it 
assumes that the prevailing concerns with energy (to 
the extent that there are any) are limited to choices 
internal to each sector. Again they are dynamic in 
that they take note of gradually changing attitudes to 
the environment, the impact of the internal market 
and a changing geopolitical framework. 
What would be the effect if we wanted a radical 
reduction in how much energy we consume, keeping or 
indeed increasing our economic welfare? Are the 
desires to have increasing economic growth, a clean 
environment and secure and moderately priced energy 
mutually compatible? This scenario seeks to explore 
this possibility. 
Economic framework 
The internal market could have an important 
economic effect, increasing the growth potential. But 
this would complement an improving world economy. 
On average, world growth is taken at 4% p.a. 
between 1990 and 2000 and 3¡Á% from then to 2010. 
The average Community GDP is 3V4% to 2000 and, 
because this rate could lead to some tensions, there is 
a slowing down after 2000 to 3% p.a. 
By sector, heavy energy intensive industry could 
continue as in scenario 2 to 1995, stabilising from 
then to 2010. Other industrial sectors would sustain 
their level of output (mainly equipment goods and 
specialised chemicals). The tertiary sector would 
expand after 1995 compensating for the slowing down 
of heavy industry. The domestic sector income would 
grow at 3% on average to 2000, declining to 2.5% 
over the period 2000 to 2010. 
From the early nineties, technology would, due to 
decisions taken before 1992, show strong innovations 
in equipment, with high capital turn­over leading to 
more economic and energy efficiency. Behaviour 
would change reflecting the decision to reduce 
emissions (a wish endorsed across the political 
spectrum). Consumer behaviour would become more 
rational ­ responding to better equipment and 
infrastructure. 
Given the structure of the scenario, with more 
economic growth and a clear poUtical consensus, 
progress is achieved in establishing the internal 
energy market ­ tax harmonisation, integration of gas 
and electricity networks and with prices and costs of 
different fuels tending to converge. 
Concern with the level of emissions could lead, after 
1992, to much stricter environmental standards. 
Energy policy 
Given growing concern over energy's impact on the 
environment, there is a renewed focus on energy 
policy with emphasis on: 
■ stricter environmental regulation; 
■ stricter and mandatory technological gains as weU 
as encouragement of rational use; 
■ diversification of fuels avoiding oU but more use of 
gas, with nuclear growing after 2000 and new 
technologies in end use and production. 
A realistic scenario ? 
If we really want to reduce emissions we need to 
improve consumption. We can consume less by 
cutting economic growth but this, for many, is 
unacceptable (zero growth means a permanently 
lower standard of living for large parts of our 
populations). The other way of improving consump­
tion is to be much more rational in how we organise 
our economies and how we use energy. What is 
described in this scenario is normative but realistic, in 
that it does not rely on some miracle technology. It is 
perhaps radical in that we already have the means 
within our grasp ­ we need to have the will. 
Transport engineering has developed a car with low 
specific energy consumption ­ of the order of 5 litres 
per 100 kilometre. Growing incomes provide the 
resources for ensuring such technology penetrates the 
market. Better domestic appliances are possible. New 
buildings can be energy efficient in construction, and 
older ones can be economically refitted. 
Major themes in energy 
Emission abatement techniques are developing: S0 2 
emissions can decline substantially, NOx can be 
further reduced, but C 0 2 poses a technical problem -
the solutions for which could be expensive (at least, 
as we understand the current state of the art). 
Nuclear has a role in the fuel mix for power 
generation, as does gas, but the most cost-efficient 
answer probably Ues in improving efficiencies and 
lowering demand by more rational and technically 
efficient use. 
Using estimates of the state of the art technology, 
new estimates of consumption levels have been 
calcuated sector by sector and fuel by fuel, on the 
basis of the growth rates described above. 
Final energy demand 
The corresponding long-term final demand growth 
could be zero to 2010; with the period after 1995 
compensating for the rather robust growth before 
then (over 2.4% reducing to -1.2% p.a.). 
Incremental industrial demand could be 23 mtoe 
compared with 50 and 114 mtoe in Scenarios 1 and 2. 
Value-added in the chemical and equipment sectors 
would be 7-10% higher compared to Scenario 1 but 
would have an energy intensity 20% less. Steel and 
cement production could be 5-6% lower. The specific 
energy consumption in these sectors could decUne by 
10% compared with Scenario 1. 
The domestic and tertiary sectors could also show 
important differences between scenarios. Incremental 
final demand in this scenario in 2010 might be 
20 mtoe compared with 53 mtoe and 104 mtoe in 
Scenarios 1 and 2 respectively. 
Incremental final 
Solids 
Oil 
Gas 
Electr. 
Heat 
Renewable 
Total 
Table 12: 
energy demand 1987-2010 
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Industry 
-16 
-11 
+ 22 
+ 21 
+ 4 
+ 20 
(Mtoe) 
Transport 
-46 
+ 6 
-40 
Domestic 
+tertiary 
-11 
-33 
+ 31 
+ 29 
+ 2 
+ 5 
+ 23 
Final 
demand 
-27 
-90 
+ 53 
+ 56 
+ 6 
+ 5 
+ 3 
The transport sector 
Traffic volumes are expected to increase substantially 
to 2010 - overaU by 60% - on the basis of the existing 
modal-spUt. The number of kUometres traveUed by 
passenger car, could increase by 64%, guided raU by 
36% and air transport could double. 
Freight transport could also grow by over 60%, with 
road growing by nearly 80% and raU and inland 
waterways by 40% and 70% respectively in 
tonne/kUometre terms. 
Clearly, by the mid-nineties congestion would grow. 
ReUeving this congestion by new infrastructure would 
probably not be sufficient - a change in modal spUt, 
moving from individual to coUective transport, would 
be required. 
The same "transport service levels" are assumed in 
this scenario but these journeys are suppUed by a 
different mix of individual cars and pubUc transport 
(a relative decline of 15% for cars and an increase of 
90% for guided rail over the modal-spUt pattern in 
"conventional wisdom"). 
SimUarly, a transfer from road to rail and inland 
waterways would be required for freight traffic, with 
the relative share of road decUning by 25%, and that 
of rail and inland waterway increasing by a third and 
a fifth respectively. 
The net effect on energy consumption of a change in 
modal split, better traffic management, and lower 
specific consumption would be about 40% lower 
consumption in Scenario 3 compared with that in 
"conventional wisdom". Total energy requirements in 
the transport sector would be 95 mtoe lower than that 
required in 1987; notwithstanding the impressive 
increase in journeys! 
Power generation 
The long-run growth rate for electricity could be 
1.7% with high growth to the mid-nineties (3.5%), 
slowing down (0.7%) but remaining positive to 2010. 
To meet this demand gross production in TWh 
should increase from 1650 to 2430; implying an 
additional 100 GW of capacity. This compares with 
230 GW required in Scenario 2 - a scenario based on 
similar levels of economic activity. The difference in 
required capacity is due to lower actual electricity 
demand, and because of fuller integration of the 
Communit/s networks. Integration aUows better 
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optimisation of the network in responding to 
Community demand, and can be serviced more 
efficiently with integrated planning and operation 
than would be the case with continuing practices. 
Table 13 
Possible Structure of 
Electricity Generating Capacities (net) In GW 
Nuclear 
Solids 
Gas 
Others 
Total 
1987 
90 
138 
18 
165 
411 
1995 
112 
145 
21 
177 
455 
2000 
119 
144 
30 
174 
467 
2010 
202 
85 
60 
155 
510 
Primary energy demand 
Because the impact of the poUcy approach outUned 
requires time to be effective, primary demand could 
continue to grow to the mid-1990s by over 3% p.a. - a 
growth rate simUar to that of Scenario 2. But as the 
poUcies begin to take effect, the rate of growth would 
become negative as we approach the new century, 
yielding on average a total long-run growth in 
primary energy demand of 0.4% from now to 2010. 
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During this latter period every sector except power 
generation could decline. Power generation would 
continue to grow at 0.7% - but at a third of that 
estimated in the corresponding economic scenario 
(Scenario %2). Primary consumption could be 100 
mtoe higher than in 1987; but economic activity could 
be 65% higher. 
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Energy and environment 
DetaUed analysis on S 0 2 and NOx estimates wiU be 
available later. For the present, the analysis is based 
on C 0 2 emissions. Given that one of the driving 
forces behind this scenario is to cut such emissions as 
far as possible, consistent with the other objectives of 
continuing growth and moderate energy prices, we 
have looked carefuUy at how C 0 2 levels could be 
radicaUy cut. The result suggests that by 2010 C 0 2 
emissions could be around 2.3 bUUon tonnes - some 
470 miUion lower than in 1987. This is a result that 
corresponds to the 1988 Toronto Declaration. 
Compared with Scenario 2 the results are impressive 
- given similar economic growth - the corresponding 
C 0 2 emissions in that scenario are 4bUlion. The 
difference of 1.7 bUlion tonnes is a measure of the 
importance of the poUcy choice. Around half a biUion 
tonnes results from better demand management and 
another billion tonnes from changes in the fuel mix in 
power generation. 
The incremental changes in electricity inputs in 2010, 
resulting from this scenario, and comparing the 2010 
results with the current situation, indicates a 
replacement by gas and nuclear (some 70 and 200 
mtoe respectively) for coal and oU (a decline of 20 
and 15 mtoe). The net additional requirement to 
meet the production level is 150 mtoe. This is 
facihtated also by an increase in thermal efficiencies. 
Energy security 
Import dependency in 2010 could be around 40%, 
compared with 55 and 62% in Scenarios 1 and 2. Coal 
requirements could be about 25 mtoe (17 mtoe), oU 
5/6 mbd (260 mtoe) and gas 230 bilUon cubic metres 
(210 mtoe). Clearly the security impUcation from 
such a scenario are more favourable to the 
Community and the risks discussed in Scenario 2 are 
correspondingly reduced. But further reflection is 
needed to check the consistency of such high gas 
imports at the price levels assumed in the scenario. 
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Conclusions 
Clearly the will to achieve such reductions in consumption levels must be present - the magnitude of such 
a change in behaviour would be considerable, but the capacity, in engineering terms and in management 
skills, are to hand The illustrations offered here in no way exhaust the different possibilities, nor do they 
imply a judgement between fuels. They do, however, offer a direction along which further reflections and 
discussions could be explored. 
Chapter S 
The choices to be made 
Introduction 
The efficiency with which we produce and use energy 
is the key to future levels of primary energy 
consumption. The energy intensity we will have 
during the coming decades will be the product of a 
complex inter­action between prices (often deter­
mined on the world market), technology (a function 
of a myriad of individual decisions), the level of 
disposal income (with taxation playing an important 
role) and nuisance (in the form of traffic congestion, 
emissions from burning hydro­carbons, radiation 
fears and siting large­scale energy installations). 
Our attitude to energy, and the balance we attribute 
to its benefits versus inconveniences, depends on the 
economic and social cycles at play. After the war the 
need was for energy as such ­ coal provided the basis 
of the reconstruction period to the mid­1950's and 
Uttle concern was expressed about secondary effects. 
OU fueUed the 1960's ­ extending the freedom of 
transport and providing more efficient means of 
industrial production. The fear of losing this fuel 
changed attitudes fundamentally during the 1970's; 
energy scarcity dominated thinking. Gradually this 
view yielded to a more relaxed attitude towards 
resources ­ they were perceived to be more plentiful 
than was thought. As we enter the 1990's, growing 
interest and concern with the environment, both 
locaUy and globaUy, will probably be the "leit motif' 
of the last decade of the 20th century. 
The common denominator to these different phases 
in Europe, phases which are currently being repeated 
in different parts of the world, is the desire to have 
access to sufficient energy sources, moderately priced 
and clean in their use. The weighting given to each 
parameter may differ through time or place but they 
remain the energy poUcy issue. 
The three scenarios explored reflect prevailing 
concerns. They would have been defined differently 
ten years ago and most certainly will be different at 
the end of the century. There is a need to be aware of 
other concerns which may arise, but as we end the 
1980s the scenarios probably reflect prevailing 
interests. What is important are the insights they 
offer to those who must take decisions in the near 
future ­ but where the effects of these decisions will 
last into the new century. 
The differences between Scenarios 1 and 2 on the one 
hand and Scenario 3 indicate the wide scope of choice 
facing decision­makers. The time for decision is 
drawing close because the impacts may not be felt 
untU early in the new century. 
The range of choice 
In 2010 final energy demand could, under Scenario 2, 
be of the order of 970 mtoe: Following the logic of 
Scenario 3 it might be 700 mtoe. This 40% difference 
in the results reflects the magnitude of the strategic 
decisions which must be made in the early 1990s. Do 
we follow the route of energy and emission conser­
vation or the more traditional paths? 
Figure 17 
Primary energy demand 
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Better management of energy consumption, even 
with high levels of economic activity, can substantially 
slow the growth in demand by the late 1990s and even 
reverse consumption patterns in the early years of the 
new century (Scenario 3). 
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Figure 19 
Improvements in energy intensity could range from 
40­60% depending on the scenario chosen ­ leading 
to lower than prevailing energy needs per head of 
population. 
Emissions of C02 could range in 2010 from 2.3 
(today they are estimated at 2.7) to 4 biUion tonnes. 
Energy intensity, (today 0.2; defined as Ktoe/Mecu 
1985) could faU between 0.08 and 0.13 ­ a 60% or 
40% improvement. 
Under Scenario 3, overall economic activity could 
nearly double by 2010, with primary energy 
consumption rising by less than 100 mtoe (1%). C02 
emission levels could be lower than todays' and the 
balance of payments in constant terms could stay 
around present levels. 
What is to be done ? 
The outcome depends on decisions in key 
areas: 
■ Energy efficiency; 
■ Power generation; 
■ Transportation; and 
■ Secure supplies. 
Energy efficiency 
The technology is aheady avaUable to achieve 
substantial savings in energy use ­ what has to change 
are attitudes and behaviour. Without a fundamental 
desire to change, the potential of our technical 
capacities wiU not be reaUsed ­ nor wiU we move as 
quickly to develop new technology. The wUl to 
implement changes is determined outside the energy 
sector, but its impact on the amount of energy we 
consume to meet our needs can be considerable. 
There are good possibiUties to meet these higher 
needs at lower consumption levels ­ by 60% if we 
really want to! 
Power generation 
Electricity intensity could be 30% lower. How 
efficiently this is generated wiU depend on the degree 
of integration of the CommunUys networks (the 
gains could be substantial ­ between 6­13 biUion ECU 
p.a. around 2010) and the choices between fuel 
preferences. Today there are fundamental questions 
about the fuel mix. 
Many utilities find that, in their local situation, fuel 
choices are limited beyond technical considerations. 
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Figure 21 
Electricity generating capacities 
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Some utUities, cannot use nuclear power to supply 
electricity. Some other utUities are required to give 
preference to local sources ­ sources which are often 
more expensive. 
Many of these decisions are poUtical rather than 
economic in origin, and changes wUl come as pubUc 
concern about non­energy issues develop. 
UtUities' attitudes do matter ­ do they meet "service 
level" requirements or electricity demand? They have 
considerable resources and expertise to develop 
energy efficiency programmes. Will they develop 
gradually to become service companies? 
Transportation 
Technical progress is possible ­ specific energy 
consumption can be decreased. Whether this wUl 
happen depends on our wUl to do so. We can have, in 
engineering terms, much more fuel­ and emission­
efficient cars. Even if we develop a more efficient 
fleet, how, when and where we use the car will be 
important. We also have to look at the basic transport 
infrastructure and the provision of improved pubUc 
transport. Change wiU not come easily. Today, pubUc 
expenditures are being reduced and in many 
instances these reductions require cuts in pubUc 
transport levels. Equally, enticing the motorist from 
his car for some of his journeys is a challenge. But 
can we allow our cities to continue to deteriorate? 
Again the decision is wider than that of energy 
considerations, but the effects on consumption will be 
important. 
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Secure supplies 
Our import dependency is growing. The extent of this 
dependency depends on consumption levels. The 
range again is important. 
Depending on the scenario, in 2010 we could require: 
Coal 
OU 
Gas 
25-400 mtce. 
6-9 miUion barrels a day. 
170-220 biUion cubic metres. 
Our suppUers need clear indications. The ranges are 
too wide to be of assistance to our partners in 
planning then own economic development. 
Figure 23 
Call on imports 
Europe 12 : Scenario 3 
100 
in % 
20-
\.' Solids 
0 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I -Λ-
ICO 
- 2 5 
1960 85 1990 95 2000 
Ι ι ι ι ι I 0 
5 2010 
The need for a 
Community energy policy 
The more uncertainty, the greater the need for a 
poUcy framework. But the uncertainty is not a 
"forecasting" phenomenon; it reflects the basic 
choices which must be made and the determination 
with which we persue our choice. There are un­
certainties within each "energy path", but the ranges 
of consumption, intensities and import requirements 
reflect more than the normal spread - the choice of 
route is political, reflecting the desires, ambitions, 
hopes and fears of our populations. 
In the foreword three questions were posed: 
How can growing demand for energy services be 
reconciled with the need to improve the quality of 
the environment? 
Can we realise the internal market in the energy 
sector without putting at risk our security of 
supply? 
Are the objectives of strong economic growth, a 
clean environment and moderately priced secure 
energy supply compatible? 
It is reasonable to believe that energy production and 
use can be reconcUed with improving the quality of 
the environment. 
The internal market wiU increase economic activity 
and foster a more enterprising climate. It also 
provides the framework for developing technology 
through higher economic growth, facilitating its 
penetration into the markets and helping to reduce 
consumption, and thus emissions, through more 
rational use of energy. 
The three objectives of sustaining economic growth, 
having a clean environment with secure and mo­
derately priced energy supply are not incompatible, 
but matching them does need an energy policy. 
Annex I 
The world oil market 
This annex presents three possible views on the world oil market, associated with the three scenarios presented 
in the main text. Oil price and GDP assumptions are shown in Figures 1-1 and 1-2. Results are presented in 
Table 1-1. 
In the first scenario (conventional wisdom) the oil price increases smoothly to USD 20/bbl (1987 dollars) in 2000 
and USD 30/bbl by 2010. In that case, OECD demand is assumed to grow by 1% up to 1995, then to slow down 
and decrease after 2000 (Figure 1-3). LDC demand grows steadily (Figure 1-4). 
In aU scenarios, CPE net exports are assumed positive until 2010 where they become nil. Given a non-OPEC 
supply of about 27 mbd, the call on OPEC crude, increases smoothly to 32.5 mbd by 2010. (Figure 1-5). 
In Scenario 2, higher GDP leads to higher OECD demand and higher prices. In that case, a "mini-shock" is 
possible, depending on OPEC reactions. 
In Scenario 3, we assume important savings of energy and a fast substitution of oU in the OECD zone (see main 
text). In that case, OECD demand by 2010 could be around present levels, while prices could be around 
USD 20/bbl. 
Table 1-1 : The three scenarios - Oil supply and demand 
in mbd 
Consumption 
OECD 
LDCs 
Total 
1973 
40.5 
7.5 
48.0 
1979 
41.8 
10.6 
52.4 
1985 
34.4 
12.4 
46.8 
1988 
36.9 
13.9 
50.8 
1990 
38.0 
15.0 
53.0 
1995 
S I 
39.8 
17.5 
57.3 
1995 
S 2/3 
41.0 
17.6 
58.5 
2000 
S1 
40.2 
19.7 
59.9 
2000 
S2 
42.1 
19.8 
67.9 
2000 
S3 
41.0 
19.4 
60.5 
2010 
S1 
39.4 
23.5 
62.8 
2010 
S2 
40.6 
22.9 
63.5 
2010 
S3 
35.7 
21.4 
57.1 
Supply 
NON OPEC 
Processing gains 
CPEs-Net exports 
OPEC 
(of which: Crude) 
17.2 
0.6 
0.4 
31.2 
30.8 
19.9 
0.8 
1.2 
31.5 
30.6 
25.6 
1.1 
1.8 
17.5 
16.0 
26.0 
1.1 
2.2 
21.4 
19.6 
26.5 
1.2 
2.1 
23.3 
21.5 
27.3 
1.2 
1.5 
27.4 
25.5 
27.3 
1.2 
1.5 
28.5 
26.6 
27.3 
1.2 
1.0 
30.4 
28.4 
27.6 
1.2 
1.0 
32.1 
30.1 
27.6 
1.2 
1.0 
30.7 
28.7 
26.8 
1.3 
0.0 
34.7 
32.5 
27.8 
1.3 
0.0 
34.4 
32.2 
26.7 
1.3 
0.0 
29.1 
26.9 
Total 
Stock changes 
49.4 
1.4 
53.4 
1.0 
46.0 
-0.8 
50.7 
-0.1 
53.1 
0.1 
57.3 
0 
58.5 
0 
59.9 
0 
61.9 
0 
60.5 
0 
62.8 
0 
63.5 
0 
57.1 
0 
i n % 
Consumption 
OECD 
LDCs 
Total 
1973 1979 
0.5 
5.9 
Í.5 
1985 
-3.2 
2.6 
-1.9 
1988 
2.3 
3.9 
2.8 
1990 
1.5 
3.9 
2.1 
1995 
S1 
1.0 
3.1 
1.6 
1995 
S 2/3 
1.5 
3.2 
2.0 
2000 
S1 
0.2 
2.4 
0.9 
2000 
S 2 
0.5 
2.4 
1.1 
2000 
S3 
0.0 
2.0 
0.6 
2010 
S1 
-0.2 
1.8 
0.5 
2010 
S2 
-0.4 
1.4 
0.2 
2010 
S3 
-1.4 
1.0 
-0.6 
Supply 
NON OPEC 2.5 4.3 0.5 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 
OPEC 0.2 -9.3 6.9 4.3 3.3 4.1 2.1 2.4 1.5 1.3 0.7 -0.5 
(of which: Crude) -0.1 -10.2 7.0 4.6 3.5 4.4 2.2 2.5 1.5 1.4 0.7 -0.6 
Total Í.3 -2.5 3.3 2.3 1.5 2.0 0.9 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.2 -0.6 
S1 = Scenario 1 , S2 = Scenario 2 , S3 = Scenario 3 
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Figure 1-1 
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35 
mbd 
Call on OPEC Crude 
(mbd) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Historic Seen 1 Seen 2 Seen 3 
DG XVII/A2 - 5/7/89 
Annex II 
World Energy Outlook - Scenario 1 
This annex presents the main points of the world energy outlook under the "conventional wisdom" 
scenario, discussed in Chapter 2, of the main text. 
The world is divided into the following zones: 
OECD : Europe-12, U.S.A., Canada, Japan, Rest of the OECD. 
CPE : USSR, Eastern Europe, China, North Korea, Vietnam. 
LDC : All the other countries. 
Hydro electricity is treated according to the IEA methodology and for this reason the Europe-12 
figures do not correspond totally with the balance sheets presented in Annex III. 
Table II-1 summarizes the main assumptions concerning GDP and energy prices for the scenario. 
Table II-2 presents the detailed primary energy demand by zone and by fuel. 
Table II-3 gives a summary of the world's final energy demand. 
Table II-4 summarizes the electricity production and fuel mix. 
Table II-5 compares our results for primary energy demand growth with some other projections, 
including the WEC. 
The CO2 emissions associated with this scenario are presented in Table 8 in the main text. 
Table II-l: Main assumptions 
A. GDP growth - in % 1990/87 1995/90 2000/95 2010/00 
EUROPE-12 
USA 
CANADA 
JAPAN 
3.2 
2.8 
3.3 
4.5 
2.7 
2.5 
2.8 
3.8 
2.7 
2.4 
2.8 
3.8 
2.7 
2.4 
2.8 
3.8 
OECD 
CPE 
LDC 
WORLD 
B. Prices 
Oil (1987 USD/bbl) 
Coal (1987 USD/t) 
1987 
18.0 
41.0 
3.2 
2.6 
4.3 
3.5 
1990 
17.3 
41.3 
2.8 
2.7 
4.0 
3.2 
1995 
17.5 
42.3 
2.8 
2.7 
4.0 
3.2 
2000 
20.0 
43.3 
2.8 
2.7 
4.0 
3.2 
2010 
30.0 
57.9 
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Table II-2: Primary energy demand 
In Mtoe 
Solid fuels 
EUROPE-12 
USA 
CANADA 
JAPAN 
RestOECD 
OECD 
CPE 
UK 
WORLD 
Oil 
EUROPE-12 
USA 
CANADA 
JAPAN 
RestOECD 
OECD 
CPE 
LDC 
WORLD 
Natural gas 
EUROPE-12 
USA 
CANADA 
JAPAN 
Rest OECD 
OECD 
CPE 
LDC 
WORLD 
Nuclear Energy 
EUROPE-12 
USA 
CANADA 
JAPAN 
RestOECD 
OECD 
CPE 
LDC 
WORLD 
Hydro etc. 
EUROPE-12 
USA 
CANADA 
JAPAN 
RestOECD 
OECD 
CPE 
LDC 
WORLD 
Total Conventional 
EUROPE-12 
USA 
CANADA 
JAPAN 
RestOECD 
OECD 
CPE 
LDC 
WORLD 
Renewables and non 
EUROPE-12 
USA 
CANADA 
OECD 
CPE 
LDC 
WORLD 
TOTAL 
EUROPE-12 
USA 
CANADA 
JAPAN 
Rest OECD 
OECD 
CPE 
LDC 
WORLD 
1985 
239.0 
440.5 
29.3 
73.7 
53.1 
835.6 
1019.8 
234.1 
2089.5 
489.2 
721.7 
68.5 
203.4 
106.2 
1589.0 
658.1 
640.1 
2887.2 
184.7 
449.4 
44.8 
35.9 
22.9 
737.7 
569.1 
167.9 
1474.7 
123.6 
102.9 
15.3 
40.4 
25.3 
307.5 
54.4 
16.5 
378.4 
42.7 
65.6 
67.8 
19.9 
60.4 
256.4 
92.1 
107.0 
455.5 
1079.2 
1780.1 
225.7 
373.3 
267.9 
3726.2 
2393.5 
1165.6 
7285.3 
commercial 
1.7 
66.5 
8.4 
76.6 
93.9 
331.5 
502.0 
1080.9 
1846.6 
234.1 
373.3 
267.9 
3802.8 
2487.4 
1497.1 
7787.3 
1987 
230.2 
452.9 
33.4 
68.5 
70.6 
855.6 
1073.6 
264.3 
2193.5 
506.3 
763.4 
69.4 
208.1 
111.7 
1658.9 
679.0 
682.2 
3020.1 
198.2 
431.9 
41.2 
36.4 
26.7 
734.4 
632.1 
189.3 
1555.8 
136.2 
122.1 
19.6 
47.5 
27.9 
353.3 
63.3 
23.4 
440.0 
43.8 
58.9 
70.6 
18.4 
64.6 
256.3 
95.1 
112.6 
464.0 
1114.7 
1829.2 
234.2 
378.9 
301.5 
3858.5 
2543. t 
7277.8 
7673.4 
2.2 
74.8 
6.8 
83.8 
93.5 
337.3 
514.6 
1116.9 
1904.0 
241.0 
378.9 
301.5 
3942.3 
2636.6 
1609.1 
8188.0 
1990 
237. J 
483.3 
33.8 
80.9 
77.6 
912.7 
1132.2 
311.6 
2356.5 
544.8 
796.4 
73.9 
216.2 
118.6 
1749.9 
735.3 
769.6 
3254.8 
212.4 
480.0 
44.7 
45.2 
32.8 
815.1 
719.5 
223.2 
1757.8 
160.6 
145.6 
26.4 
54.7 
28.6 
415.9 
81.7 
30.3 
527.9 
47.2 
67.8 
73.4 
21.8 
66.5 
276.7 
106.1 
126.5 
509.3 
1202.1 
1973.1 
252.2 
418.8 
324.1 
4170.3 
2774.8 
1461.2 
8406.3 
2.0 
76.2 
6.9 
85.1 
97.7 
349.5 
532.3 
1204.1 
2049.3 
259.1 
418.8 
324.1 
4255.4 
2872.5 
1810.7 
8938.6 
1995 
248.2 
532.0 
39.7 
88.6 
90.4 
998.9 
1218.5 
406.1 
2623.5 
569.6 
837.1 
79.8 
225.0 
124.5 
1836.0 
817.7 
895.6 
3549.3 
232.3 
524.1 
51.2 
55.4 
40.8 
903.8 
930.7 
291.3 
2125.8 
179.6 
756.8 
30.0 
70.5 
28.6 
465.5 
725.7 
46.6 
637.8 
50.2 
70.7 
87.3 
24.5 
70.0 
296.1 
726.6 
754.0 
576.7 
1279.9 
2120.1 
282.0 
464.0 
354.3 
4500.3 
3219.2 
1793.6 
9513.1 
3.0 
78.5 
7.1 
88.6 
104.7 
371.1 
564.4 
1282.9 
2198.6 
289.1 
464.0 
354.3 
4588.9 
3323.9 
2164.7 
10077.5 
2000 
276.7 
578.7 
48.2 
95.0 
104.7 
1102.1 
1303.9 
520.8 
2926.8 
557.2 
870.4 
82.1 
220.6 
121.8 
1852.1 
889.4 
1008.8 
3750.3 
248.7 
569.4 
58.1 
66.0 
48.0 
990.2 
1173.3 
377.8 
2541.3 
196.1 
163.6 
31.4 
90.8 
26.5 
508.4 
160.4 
71.7 
740.5 
52.8 
73.0 
87.0 
28.5 
73.4 
314.7 
148.0 
187.3 
650.0 
1330.9 
2254.5 
306.8 
500.9 
374.4 
4767.5 
3675.0 
2166.4 
10608.9 
3.9 
80.8 
7.3 
92.0 
109.8 
393.9 
595.7 
1334.8 
2335.3 
314.1 
500.9 
374.4 
4859.5 
3784.8 
2560.3 
11204.6 
2005 
302.9 
626.5 
53.8 
700.2 
722.0 
7205.4 
7377.7 
670.6 
3253.7 
539.3 
883.8 
82.8 
276.5 
117.8 
1840.2 
954.6 
7709.9 
3904.7 
262.2 
673.5 
64.8 
77.2 
55.7 
1073.4 
1442.5 
491.5 
3007.4 
220.1 
173.6 
32.9 
110.5 
18.4 
555.5 
785.9 
96.0 
837.4 
53.9 
75.3 
93.5 
37.7 
77.0 
330.8 
170.2 
227.7 
728.7 
7378.4 
2372.7 
327.8 
535.5 
390.9 
5005.3 
4130.3 
2595.7 
11731.3 
5.0 
83.3 
7.6 
95.9 
112.4 
478.7 
626.4 
1383.4 
2456.0 
335.4 
535.5 
390.9 
5101.2 
4242.7 
3013.8 
12357.7 
2010 
323.3 
676.4 
60.4 
706.7 
738.0 
1304.2 
1435.2 
835.8 
3575.2 
522.7 
886.0 
82.5 
209.7 
774.7 
7874.4 
7074.3 
7202.9 
4037.6 
276.7 
662.0 
72.3 
90.4 
63.2 
JJ64.0 
1745.6 
625.5 
3535.1 
251.5 
189.8 
34.3 
128.1 
12.8 
616.5 
215.6 
128.4 
960.5 
54.7 
78.0 
99.9 
33.8 
80.6 
347.0 
193.9 
264.1 
805.0 
1427.7 
2492.2 
349.4 
568.1 
408.7 
5246.1 
4604.6 
3056.7 
12907.4 
6.4 
85.8 
7.8 
700.0 
773.2 
443.8 
657.0 
1434.1 
2578.0 
357.2 
568.1 
408.7 
5346.1 
4717.8 
3500.5 
13564.4 
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Table Π-3: World Final Energy Demand 
In Mtoe 1985 1987 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Solids 
OH 
Gas 
Electricity 
Heat 
Others 
Solids 
OH 
Gas 
Electricity 
Heat 
Others 
921.8 
2323.9 
894.5 
702.8 
179.3 
500.3 
910.2 
2449.8 
946.4 
759.1 
184.5 
512.4 
954.8 
2643.6 
1080.7 
848.8 
199.0 
530.4 
1013.3 
2884.6 
1240.6 
1011.0 
220.7 
562.3 
1036.1 
3063.7 
1431.7 
1186.7 
247.5 
593.7 
7036.7 
3229.6 
1628.1 
1376.4 
272.9 
623.3 
1029.1 
3373.0 
1852.9 
1580.8 
295.2 
653.4 
TOTAL 
ln% 
5522.6 
1985 
5762.4 
1987 
6257.3 
1990 
6932.5 
1995 
7558.8 
2000 
8166.4 
2005 
8784.4 
2010 
16.7 
42.1 
16.2 
12.7 
3.2 
9.1 
15.8 
42.5 
16.4 
13.2 
3.2 
8.9 
15.3 
42.2 
17.3 
13.6 
3.2 
8.5 
Í4.6 
47.6 
77.9 
74.6 
3.2 
8.7 
73.7 
40.5 
78.9 
75.7 
3.3 
7.8 
12.7 
39.5 
19.9 
16.9 
3.3 
7.6 
11.7 
38.4 
27.7 
78.0 
3.4 
7.4 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
A. Electricity gross production 
Table Π-4: Electricity 
InTWh 1985 1987 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
EUROPE-12 
USA 
CANADA 
JAPAN 
Rest OECD 
OECD 
CPE 
LDC 
WORLD 
1572.7 
2621.9 
459.0 
672.0 
577.6 
5903.2 
2558.8 
1379.1 
9841.1 
2067.3 
21.0 
1492.0 
15.2 
6281.8 
63.8 
1659.2 
2732.5 
496.4 
719.1 
625.1 
6232.3 
2793.4 
1554.0 
10579.7 
2104.4 
19.9 
1739.1 
16.4 
6736.2 
63.7 
1812.8 
3016.3 
534.9 
810.5 
669.8 
6844.2 
3093.0 
1891.9 
11829.1 
2305.8 
19.5 
2087.2 
17.6 
7436.0 
62.9 
2051.2 
3446.5 
618.6 
927.9 
748.8 
7793.0 
3723.3 
2580.2 
14096.5 
2610.5 
18.5 
2522.1 
17.9 
8964.0 
63.6 
2255.8 
3873.3 
698.8 
7052.3 
824.4 
8704.7 
4396.5 
3453.5 
16554.7 
2940.7 
77.8 
2927.9 
17.7 
10686.0 
64.6 
2440.7 
4301.2 
769.8 
1179.1 
896.5 
9587.2 
5088.4 
4534.9 
19210.5 
3296.5 
17.2 
3310.5 
17.2 
12603.5 
65.6 
2634.9 
4753.5 
848.8 
1309.3 
974.4 
10520.9 
5814.0 
5732.6 
22067.4 
3640.7 
76.5 
3797.7 
17.2 
14629.1 
66.3 
of which: 
Hydro etc 
ln% 
Nuclear 
in% 
Thermal 
ln% 
B. Inputs to Thermal power stations 
In Mtoe 1985 1987 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Solids 
Oil 
Gas 
Others 
1042.0 
320.7 
369.2 
1.7 
1733.6 
540.2 
37.2 
7776.3 
379.8 
398.4 
2.2 
1836.7 
579.3 
37.5 
1227.7 
343.2 
467.7 
1.9 
2033.9 
639.5 
37.4 
7428.6 
379.4 
639.4 
2.1 
2449.5 
770.9 
31.5 
1700.8 
389.3 
831.9 
2.8 
2924.6 
979.0 
37.4 
2017.4 
367.8 
1070.3 
3.1 
3458.6 
7083.9 
37.3 
2335.6 
342.4 
1339.7 
3.6 
4021.3 
7258.7 
37.3 
TOTAL 
Electricity 
EtHc4n% 
ln% 1985 1987 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Solids 
Oil 
Gas 
Others 
60.1 
18.5 
21.3 
0.1 
60.8 
17.4 
21.7 
0.1 
60.4 
16.9 
22.7 
0.1 
58.3 
15.5 
26.1 
0.1 
58.2 
13.3 
28.4 
0.1 
58.3 
10.6 
30.9 
0.1 
58.7 
8.5 
33.3 
0.1 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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Table II-5: World Primary Energy Demand Growth 
Comparison with other projections 
i n% 
CEC-DG XVII/A2 
Solids 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
TOTAL 
IEA-June 89 
Solids 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
TOTAL 
WEC/M-1989 
Solids 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
TOTAL 
M ITI-1989 
Solids 
Oil 
Gas 
Nuclear 
TOTAL 
1995/87 
2.3 
2.0 
4.0 
4.7 
2.6 
2.7 
1.9 
3.3 
4.1 
2.4 
2000/85 
2.3 
1.8 
3.7 
4.6 
2.5 
7.9 
7.4 
2.4 
4.6 
2.0 
2005/95 
2.2 
1.0 
3.5 
2.8 
2.1 
2.7 
1.4 
4.1 
1.9 
2.5 
2005/87 
2.2 
1.4 
3.7 
3.6 
2.3 
2.4 
1.6 
3.7 
2.9 
2.4 
2010/85 
2.2 
1.3 
3.6 
3.8 
2.2 
2.6 
1.5 
2.8 
2.9 
2.3 
2020/85 
7.9 
7.0 
7.5 
3.4 
1.6 
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Annual energy balance -1987 
Mtoe 
1987 
Domestic Production 
Net Imports 
Bunkers 
Primary Demand 
Energy Sector 
Total Final 
Non Energy Uses 
Final Energy 
of which: 
Industry 
Transportation 
Domestic\Tertlary 
Stock change 
Stat. Error 
Solids 
168.9 
59.2 
0.0 
230.2 
171.6 
59.5 
1.3 
58.2 
40.8 
0.1 
17.3 
-2.0 
-0.9 
Oil 
150.9 
357.4 
29.7 
476.6 
67.8 
408.4 
57.1 
351.3 
50.3 
195.6 
105.4 
2.0 
0.4 
Gas 
129.0 
71.6 
0.0 
198.2 
19.4 
178.3 
11.5 
166.8 
68.0 
0.2 
98.6 
2.3 
0.5 
Nuclear 
136.3 
0.0 
0.0 
136.3 
136.3 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Hydro 
14.9 
0.0 
0.0 
14.9 
14.9 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Electr. 
0.0 
1.6 
0.0 
1.6 
-118.5 
120.1 
0.0 
120.1 
52.0 
2.8 
65.2 
0.0 
0.0 
Heat 
2.3 
0.0 
0.0 
2.3. 
-2.9 
5.2 
0.0 
5.2 
2.8 
0.0 
2.5 
0.0 
0.0 
Renew. 
2.2 
0.0 
0.0 
2.2 
2.2 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
TOTAL 
604.5 
489.7 
29.7 
1062.3 
290.8 
771.5 
69.9 
701.6 
213.8 
198.8 
289.0 
2.3 
0.0 
Source: SOEC 
Scenario 1 - Annual Energy Balance 
Mtoe 
1995 
1995 
Domestic Production 
Net Imports 
Bunkers 
Primary Demand 
Energy Sector 
Total Final 
Non Energy Uses 
Final Energy 
of which: 
Industry 
Transportation 
Domestic\Tertiary 
Solids 
140.9 
107.2 
0.0 
248.1 
194.7 
53.4 
1.3 
52.1 
38.1 
0.1 
13.9 
Oil 
125.2 
444.4 
28.6 
541.0 
89.4 
451.6 
61.1 
390.5 
54.1 
232.7 
103.7 
Gas 
136.8 
95.4 
0.0 
232.3 
25.2 
207.1 
13.6 
193.4 
78.0 
0.2 
115.3 
Nuclear 
179.6 
0.0 
0.0 
179.6 
179.6 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Hydro 
16.8 
0.0 
0.0 
16.8 
16.8 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Electr. 
0.0 
1.9 
0.0 
1.9 
-146.9 
148.8 
0.0 
148.8 
61.7 
4.2 
82.9 
Heat 
3.4 
0.0 
0.0 
3.4 
-4.4 
7.8 
0.0 
7.8 
4.5 
0.0 
3.3 
Renew. 
3.0 
0.0 
0.0 
3.0 
2.1 
0.9 
0.0 
0.9 
0.0 
0.0 
0.9 
TOTAL 
605.7 
649.0 
28.6 
1226.1 
356.6 
869.6 
76.0 
793.5 
236.4 
237.2 
319.9 
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Scenario 1 - Annual Energy Balance - 2000 
Mtoe 
2000 
Domestic Production 
Net Imports 
Bunkers 
Primary Demand 
Energy Sector 
Total Final 
Non Energy Uses 
Final Energy 
of which: 
Industry 
Transportation 
Domestic\Tertiary 
Solids 
122.9 
153.3 
0.0 
276.1 
225.5 
50.7 
1.2 
49.4 
37.9 
0.1 
11.5 
Oil 
111.9 
445.3 
29.0 
528.2 
79.9 
448.4 
62.6 
385.8 
51.4 
240.6 
93.8 
Gas 
135.9 
113.0 
0.0 
248.8 
31.6 
217.3 
14.1 
203.2 
80.9 
0.2 
122.0 
Nuclear 
196.1 
0.0 
0.0 
196.1 
196.1 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Hydro 
17.4 
0.0 
0.0 
17.4 
17.4 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Electr. 
0.0 
1.7 
0.0 
1.7 
-162.4 
164.0 
0.0 
164.0 
66.5 
4.9 
92.7 
Heat 
4.6 
0.0 
0.0 
4.6 
-5.8 
10.5 
0.0 
10.5 
6.2 
0.0 
4.2 
Renew. 
3.9 
0.0 
0.0 
3.9 
2.7 
1.3 
0.0 
1.3 
0.0 
0.0 
1.3 
TOTAL 
592.6 
713.2 
29.0 
1276.8 
384.8 
892.0 
77.9 
814.1 
243.0 
245.7 
325.4 
Scenario 1 - Annual Energy Balance - 2010 
Mtoe 
2010 
Domestic Production 
Net Imports 
Bunkers 
Primary Demand 
Energy Sector 
Total Final 
Non Energy Uses 
Final Energy 
of which: 
Industry 
Transportation 
Domestic\Tertiary 
Solids 
105.6 
217.6 
0.0 
323.2 
273.2 
50.0 
1.2 
48.8 
39.7 
0.0 
9.2 
Oil 
103.3 
418.8 
29.1 
493.1 
51.4 
441.7 
65.6 
376.1 
49.5 
247.4 
79.3 
Gas 
121.7 
154.4 
0.0 
276.1 
42.2 
233.9 
14.9 
218.9 
88.0 
0.2 
130.7 
Nuclear 
251.5 
0.0 
0.0 
251.5 
251.5 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Hydro 
18.0 
0.0 
0.0 
18.0 
18.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Electr. 
0.0 
1.2 
0.0 
1.2 
-190.9 
192.1 
0.0 
192.1 
78.4 
6.1 
107.5 
Heat 
5.4 
0.0 
0.0 
5.4 
-6.4 
11.8 
0.0 
11.8 
7.0 
0.0 
4.8 
Renew. 
6.4 
0.0 
0.0 
6.4 
3.6 
2.7 
0.0 
2.7 
0.0 
0.0 
2.7 
TOTAL 
611.9 
792.1 
29.1 
1374.8 
442.7 
932.2 
81.7 
850.5 
262.6 
253.8 
334.1 
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Scenarios 2 and 3 - Annual Energy Balance 
Mtoe 
1995 
1995 
Domestic Production 
Net Imports 
Bunkers 
Primary Demand 
Energy Sector 
Total Final 
Non Energy Uses 
Final Energy 
of which: 
Industry 
Transportation 
Domestic\Tertiary 
Solids 
150.0 
113.2 
0.0 
263.2 
206.8 
56.4 
1.3 
55.1 
39.0 
0.1 
16.0 
Oil 
140.0 
461.6 
28.6 
573.0 
93.7 
479.2 
63.7 
415.5 
56.5 
250.0 
109.0 
Gas 
140.0 
114.4 
0.0 
254.4 
29.3 
225.1 
14.9 
210.2 
85.0 
0.2 
125.0 
Nuclear 
179.6 
0.0 
0.0 
179.6 
179.6 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Hydro 
16.8 
0.0 
0.0 
16.8 
16.8 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Electr. 
0.0 
1.9 
0.0 
1.9 
-156.7 
158.6 
0.0 
158.6 
67.5 
4.1 
87.0 
Heat 
3.4 
0.0 
0.0. 
3.4 
-4.7 
8.1 
0.0 
8.1 
4.5 
0.0 
3.6 
Renew. 
4.0 
0.0 
0.0 
4.0 
3.1 
0.9 
0.0 
0.9 
0.0 
0.0 
0.9 
TOTAL 
633.8 
691.1 
28.6 
1296.3 
368.0 
928.3 
79.9 
848.4 
252.5 
254.4 
341.5 
Scenario 2 - Annual Energy Balance - 2010 
Mtoe 
2010 
Domestic Production 
Net Imports 
Bunkers 
Primary Demand 
Energy Sector 
Total Final 
Non Energy Uses 
Final Energy 
of wich: 
Industry 
Transportation 
Domestic\Tertiary 
Solids 
125.0 
274.7 
0.0 
399.7 
347.3 
52.5 
1.5 
51.0 
42.0 
0.0 
9.0 
Oil 
125.0 
441.7 
29.1 
537.6 
68.3 
469.3 
66.3 
403.0 
50.0 
268.0 
85.0 
Gas 
135.0 
192.2 
0.0 
327.2 
44.2 
283.1 
17.9 
265.2 
105.0 
0.2 
160.0 
Nuclear 
260.0 
0.0 
0.0 
260.0 
260.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Hydro 
18.0 
0.0 
0.0 
18.0 
18.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Electr. 
0.0 
3.2 
0.0 
3.2 
-228.3 
231.5 
0.0 
231.5 
97.5 
6.0 
128.0 
Heat 
5.4 
0.0 
0.0 
5.4 
-6.6 
12.0 
0.0 
12.0 
7.0 
0.0 
5.0 
Renew. 
7.1 
0.0 
0.0 
7.1 
4.3 
2.8 
0.0 
2.8 
0.0 
0.0 
2.8 
TOTAL 
675.5 
911.9 
29.1 
1558.3 
507.2 
1051.1 
85.6 
965.5 
301.5 
274.2 
389.8 
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Scenario 3 - Annual Energy Balance - 2010 
Mtoe 
2010 
Domestic Production 
Net Imports 
Bunkers 
Primary Demand 
Energy Sector 
Total Final 
Non Energy Uses 
Final Energy 
of which: 
Industry 
Transportation 
Domestic\Tertiary 
Solids 
60.0 
47.4 
0.0 
107.4 
75.6 
31.8 
0.8 
31.0 
25.0 
0.0 
6.0 
Oil 
100.0 
268.7 
20.0 
348.7 
41.7 
307.0 
46.0 
261.0 
39.0 
150.0 
72.0 
Gas 
135.0 
200.0 
0.0 
335.0 
100.4 
234.6 
14.4 
220.2 
90.0 
0.2 
130.0 
Nuclear 
340.0 
0.0 
0.0 
340.0 
340.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Hydro 
18.0 
0.0 
0.0 
18.0 
18.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Electr. 
0.0 
-1.1 
0.0 
-1.1 
-177.1 
176.0 
0.0 
176.0 
73.0 
8.5 
94.5 
Heat 
5.4 
0.0 
0.0 
5.4 
-5.6 
11.0 
0.0 
11.0 
7.0 
0.0 
4.0 
Renew. 
9.5 
0.0 
0.0 
9.5 
4.5 
5.0 
0.0 
5.0 
0.0 
0.0 
5.0 
TOTAL 
667.9 
515.0 
20.0 
1162.9 
397.5 
765.4 
61.2 
704.2 
234.0 
158.7 
311.5 
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Scenario 1 
Annual S( )i Emissions Balance 
(1000 tonnes) 
1986 
Energy sector of which 
Power generation 
Other conversions 
Final demand of which. 
Industry 
Transport 
Other sectors 
Total 
1995 
Energy sector of which. 
Power generation 
Other conversions 
Final demand of which: 
Industry 
Transport 
Other sectors 
Total 
2000 
Energy sector of which: 
Power generation 
Other conversions 
Final demand of which: 
Industry 
Transport 
Other sectors 
Total 
2010 
Energy sector of which: 
Power generation 
Other conversions 
Final demand of which: 
Industry 
Transport 
Other sectors 
Total 
Solids 
6508 
23 
699 
0 
502 
7732 
Solids 
5532 
7 
599 
0 
353 
6491 
Solids 
4622 
6 
635 
0 
289 
5552 
Solids 
7609 
5 
745 
0 
236 
2595 
Oil 
2087 
7373 
7404 
559 
794 
6151 
Oil 
2596 
1281 
1835 
715 
689 
7116 
Oil 
2673 
1267 
1697 
755 
624 
7016 
Oil 
983 
1064 
1573 
802 
528 
4950 
Gas 
27 
39 
55 
0 
7 
116 
Gas 
22 
0 
48 
0 
1 
71 
Gas 
20 
0 
45 
0 
1 
66 
Gas 
17 
0 
41 
0 
1 
59 
Total 
8610 
1375 
2158 
559 
1297 
13999 
Total 
8150 
1288 
2482 
715 
1043 
13678 
Total 
7315 
1273 
2377 
755 
914 
12634 
Total 
2609 
1069 
2359 
802 
765 
7604 
Scenario 1 
Annual N O x Emissions Balance 
(1000 tonnes) 
1986 
Energy sector of which. 
Power generation 
Other conversions 
Final demand of which: 
Industry 
Transport 
Other sectors 
Total 
1995 
Energy sector of which: 
Power generation 
Other conversions 
Final demand of which: 
Industry 
Transport 
Other sectors 
Total 
2000 
Energy sector of which: 
Power generation 
Other conversions 
Final demand of which: 
Industry 
Transport 
Other sectors 
Total 
2010 
Energy sector of which: 
Power generation 
Other conversions 
Final demand of which: 
Industry 
Transport 
Other sectors 
Total 
Solids 
7894 
23 
699 
0 
501 
3117 
Solids 
7838 
3 
206 
0 
54 
2101 
Solids 
7853 
3 
273 
0 
43 
2112 
Solids 
1640 
2 
240 
0 
33 
1915 
on 
337 
1313 
1404 
559 
794 
4407 
Oil 
470 
347 
323 
6060 
330 
7530 
Oil 
455 
343 
301 
5320 
302 
6721 
Oil 
772 
320 
282 
5533 
254 
6561 
Gas 
765 
39 
55 
0 
1 
260 
Gas 
772 
9 
285 
0 
239 
705 
Gas 
759 
70 
299 
0 
253 
721 
Gas 
277 
10 
334 
0 
271 
832 
Total 
2396 
1375 
2158 
559 
1296 
7784 
Total 
2480 
359 
814 
6060 
623 
10336 
Total 
2467 
356 
813 
5320 
598 
9554 
Total 
2029 
332 
856 
5533 
558 
9308 
59 
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Scenario 1 
Annual CO2 Emissions Balance 
(million tonnes) 
1987 solids 
Energy sector of which: 
Power generation 603 
Other conversions 104 
Oil 
709 
94 
Gas 
89 
24 
Total 
801 
222 
Final demand of which: 
Industry 
Transport 
Other sectors 
168 
1 
71 
153 
602 
322 
188 
0 
206 
509 
603 
599 
Industry 
Transport 
Other sectors 
168 
1 
71 
153 
602 
322 
188 
0 
206 
509 
603 
599 
Total 947 1280 507 2734 
1995 
Energy sector of which. 
Power generation 
Other conversions 
Solids 
704 
98 
Oil 
167 
103 
Gas 
702 
28 
Total 
973 
229 
Final demand of which: 
Industry 
Transport 
Other sectors 
157 
0 
57 
164 
706 
314 
215 
1 
378 
534 
707 
689 
Industry 
Transport 
Other sectors 
161 
0 
66 
171 
758 
331 
234 
1 
345 
566 
759 
742 
Total 1016 1454 664 3134 
2000 solids 
Energy sector of which: 
Power generation 837 
Other conversions 92 
Oil 
140 
101 
Gas 
117 
29 
Total 
1094 
222 
Final demand of which: 
Total 1132 1411 707 3250 
2010 Solids 
Energy sector of which: 
Power generation 1033 
Other conversions 92 
Oil 
63 
91 
Gas 
745 
30 
Total 
1241 
214 
Final demand of which: 
Industry 
Transport 
Other sectors 
164 
0 
38 
150 
751 
240 
243 
1 
360 
557 
752 
638 
Final demand of which: 
Industry 
Transport 
Other sectors 
173 
0 
37 
152 
813 
258 
290 
1 
441 
615 
814 
736 
Total 1327 1296 779 3402 
Scenario 2 
Annual CO2 Emissions Balance 
(million tonnes) 
1987 solids 
Energy sector of which: 
Power generation 603 
Other conversions 104 
Oil 
709 
94 
Gas 
89 
24 
Total 
801 
222 
Final demand of which: 
Total 947 1280 507 2734 
1995 
Energy sector of which. 
Power generation 
Other conversions 
Solids 
751 
101 
Oil 
773 
709 
Gas 
7 74 
30 
Total 
1038 
240 
Final demand of which: 
Total 1079 1542 724 3345 
2000 
Energy sector of which. 
Power generation 
Other conversions 
Solids 
7072 
97 
Oil 
174 
113 
Gas 
129 
33 
Total 
1315 
243 
Final demand of which: 
Industry 
Transport 
Other sectors 
156 
0 
47 
156 
730 
284 
224 
1 
336 
536 
731 
667 
Industry 
Transport 
Other sectors 
165 
0 
58 
179 
831 
319 
256 
1 
386 
600 
832 
763 
Total 1332 1616 805 3753 
2010 solids 
Energy sector of which: 
Power generation 1333 
Other conversions 98 
Oil 
708 
97 
Gas 
748 
36 
Total 
1589 
231 
Total 1641 1428 916 3985 
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Scenario 3 
Annual CO2 Emissions Balance 
(million tonnes) 
1987 
Energy sector of which. 
Power generation 
Other conversions 
Final demand of which. 
Industry 
Transport 
Other sectors 
Total 
Solids 
603 
104 
168 
1 
71 
947 
Oil 
109 
94 
153 
602 
322 
1280 
Gas 
89 
24 
188 
0 
206 
507 
Total 
801 
222 
509 
603 
599 
2734 
1995 
Energy sector of which. 
Power generation 
Other conversions 
Final demand of which: 
Industry 
Transport 
Other sectors 
Total 
Solids 
757 
707 
161 
0 
66 
1079 
Oil 
773 
709 
777 
758 
337 
1542 
Gas 
7 74 
30 
234 
1 
345 
724 
Total 
1038 
240 
566 
759 
742 
3345 
2000 
Energy sector of which: 
Power generation 
Other conversions 
Final demand of which: 
Industry 
Transport 
Other sectors 
Total 
Sol ids 
736 
83 
140 
0 
47 
1006 
Oil 
734 
702 
164 
728 
309 
1437 
Gas 
185 
31 
243 
1 
358 
818 
Total 
1055 
216 
547 
729 
714 
3261 
2010 
Energy sector of which: 
Power generation 
Other conversions 
Final demand of which: 
Industry 
Transport 
Other sectors 
Total 
Sol ids 
253 
58 
703 
0 
25 
439 
Oil 
62 
64 
118 
455 
218 
917 
Gas 
308 
30 
248 
1 
358 
945 
Total 
623 
152 
469 
456 
601 
2301 
Major themes in energy 
Energy 2010 Project 
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Experts 
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